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 CLASSIFYING FEDERAL TAXES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
PURPOSES 
Evgeny Magidenko∗ 
 In 2012, ruling on a challenge to President Obama’s landmark 
healthcare legislation, the Supreme Court upheld the legislation’s 
individual mandate penalty as a tax.1  The Court’s decision relied in 
part on the finding that the penalty was not a direct tax and so its lack 
of apportionment was not fatal.2  This was the first Supreme Court 
case in decades to address direct taxes, but regrettably it provided 
only a cursory examination of the subject.  It did, however, serve as a 
useful reminder that the constitutional analysis of taxes is not a 
foregone conclusion and confirmed that there is a tenable distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes.3 
As the national government’s expenditures continue to outpace 
revenues, calls for new forms of federal taxation to right the balance 
will become more persistent.4  This pressure leads to the 
understandable desire to test the outer limits of the federal 
government’s taxation power, with creative minds finding new 
methods of levying and collecting taxes never contemplated by the 
Founding Fathers.  To adequately assess the validity of any proposed 
tax and fit it into the constitutional system, it is useful to have a 
roadmap from which to proceed.  This Article seeks to develop such 
a model.  As the examination that follows demonstrates, this is far 
from straightforward; however, having categorized the tax in 
question, it is often relatively simple to determine just what one can 
and cannot do with it.  This Article focuses on taxes that may be 
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 1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–600 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 2599–600. 
 3. Id. at 2594–600. 
 4. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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imposed by the federal government, so constitutional limits on the 
powers of state taxation will not be addressed.5 
The Article’s first part examines the text of the Constitution’s tax 
clauses and the history behind them.6  The second part surveys the 
Supreme Court cases interpreting these provisions.7  The third part 
outlines a five-category model for classifying taxes for constitutional 
purposes.8  The fourth and final part examines how this model applies 
to selected taxes proposed in recent years.9 
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S TAX PROVISIONS 
A. The Text of the Direct (and “Indirect”) Tax Provisions 
The best place to start any constitutional analysis is the text of the 
United States Constitution, in which several clauses address taxation, 
direct and otherwise.10  It is imperative to consider these provisions 
together, as their interplay informs any attempt to create a model to 
describe cogently the constitutional universe of taxation. 
The basic constitutional provision authorizing the imposition of 
taxes states simply: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”11  The term “taxes” 
covers all possible levies.  It “is generical, and was made use of to 
vest in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation.”12  In 
general, the taxing power has been understood broadly,13 though 
 
 5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the implied “Dormant Commerce Clause”); id. 
art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3. 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.  The review will be brief, as others have already conducted 
exhaustive historical analyses of these provisions.  See, e.g., James R. Campbell, 
Dispelling the Fog About Direct Taxation, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 109 (2012); 
Charles J. Bullock, The Origin, Purpose, and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of the 
Federal Constitution. I., 15 POL. SCI. Q. 217 (1900). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See discussion infra Part III. 
 9. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 10. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 12. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 13. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income 
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 22 (1992).  But see Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing 
Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1057, 1059 (2001) (challenging “the notion that the taxing power is plenary . . . the 
specific limitations on the taxing power in the Constitution weren’t intended to be 
trivial.”).  The clause granting the taxing power reads fully: “The Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States[.]”  U.S. 
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modified by the structural restriction that an exaction must not be so 
punitive as to violate due process.14  To properly execute its 
functions, a government requires flexibility in raising revenue, and 
this grant of a general taxation power provides just that.  Almost any 
revenue-raising measure can be called a tax. 
Duties, imposts, and excises are a subset of taxes, commonly 
referred to as indirect (by negative implication from the explicitly 
mentioned direct taxes, discussed in the next paragraph), and are 
subject to the Constitution’s Uniformity Clause: “all Duties, Imposts 
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”15  This 
has generally been understood to require geographical uniformity 
only.16  That is, the federal government must ensure that a tax does 
not apply differently among the states; however, the incidence of the 
tax may vary.17  For example, if the federal government levies an 
excise on all hamburgers sold in the United States, the rate cannot 
differ based on geography, but if hamburger consumption (or 
production) varies in different parts of the country—as it surely 
does—then the collections from those parts need not be uniform.  The 
Uniformity Clause extends only to the fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and incorporated territories of the United States.18   
Direct taxes, another subset of taxes, are subject to apportionment: 
“[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.”19  This requirement also appears in another clause: “[D]irect 
Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be 
 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The modifier means that the revenue collected must be used 
for public purposes.  South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 450 (1905). 
 14. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1916). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 16. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes:” Are Consumption Taxes 
Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2340 (1997). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that it did not violate 
uniformity for Congress to impose duties on only Puerto Rican products after the 
United States acquired the territory from Spain, as Puerto Rico was not incorporated 
into the United States).  An incorporated territory is one which Congress intends to 
incorporate into the United States and make an integral part of the country.  The only 
incorporated territory held by the United States today is Palmyra Atoll, an archipelago 
in the Pacific Ocean with no permanent population.  American Samoa, Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and the 
various other small possessions (predominantly islands scattered throughout the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean) belonging to the United States are 
unincorporated and outside the Uniformity Clause’s reach. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
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included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers. . . 
.”20  The considerable debate on the nature and extent of direct 
taxation notwithstanding,21 there is agreement on what apportionment 
actually entails.22  If a tax is to be apportioned, each state must pay 
proportionately to its number of residents as of the last census; thus, 
if California has twelve percent of the United States’ population, then 
it is responsible for paying twelve percent of the total tax imposed 
across all the states.   
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, removed the 
apportionment requirement for income taxes: “[t]he Congress shall 
have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”23  The curious 
corollary issue here is that if certain income taxes are still considered 
direct, then they are exempt from both the apportionment and 
uniformity requirements; the Supreme Court’s approach to this 
question has been ambiguous.24  In any case, the view of what 
constitutes income has expanded over the past century, such that 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  There is a 
question about the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment has modified the 
apportionment requirement.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the 
Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 53 (1999) (“The question is . . . whether the repeal 
of slavery should lead courts to construe [the ‘direct tax’ clauses’] meaning 
narrowly.”); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the 
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 26 (1998) (“When slavery 
ended, the historical rationale for the federal formula ended as well, but the formula 
remained as an allocation by population, counting every individual as one, but devoid 
of any remaining constitutional purpose.”).  However, the apportionment requirement 
appears in two different constitutional clauses, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
modified only one of them.  The best reading is that the apportionment requirement 
remains unchanged, although reasonable minds may disagree. 
 21. Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 
15 J.L. & POL. 687 (1999), responding to Ackerman, supra note 20, responding to 
Jensen, supra note 16.  “The phrase ‘direct taxes’ is confessedly blind,” and 
“Alexander Hamilton warned . . . that we should search in vain for a settled legal 
meaning.”  Dwight W. Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 
379, 414 (1910). 
 22. Mark E. Berg, Determining Which Taxes Are Prohibited Direct Taxes After NFIB, 
138 TAX NOTES 205, 205–06 (Jan. 14, 2013). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  For an excellent summation of the back-and-forth 
surrounding the Amendment’s ratification, as well as the history of the direct tax 
provisions generally, see Morrow, supra note 21, at 385–98. 
 24. See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 14, 18–19 (1916) (discussing 
whether a tax on income should be subject to the requirements of apportionment and 
uniformity).  
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today the Supreme Court generally defers to the views of Congress 
and the Treasury Department in analyzing what is income.25 
The constitutional prohibition against taxes on exports also bears 
brief mention: “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported 
from any State.”26  This provision bans not only taxes falling squarely 
on exports, but also some that indirectly burden those exports.27 
B. A Brief History of the Constitution’s Tax Provisions 
In examining constitutional provisions, in addition to the text of the 
Constitution itself, history too may be helpful to consider.28  The men 
who wrote our organic law were informed by the events and passions 
of their time.  To better appreciate the context in which the 
Constitution’s tax provisions arose, it is necessary to detour briefly 
and survey their origin.29 
Having declared independence from Great Britain in 1776, the 
American colonies had to devise a system to jointly raise revenue.  
Keeping with the decentralized nature of the Articles of 
Confederation, their primary revenue mechanism became that of 
requisitions, where the central government would total its expenses 
for a given fiscal cycle and then request the funds from the states.30  
After much haggling over the method of apportionment, it was 
decided that each state would contribute to the central treasury 
proportionately to the value of the land and improvements located 
within that state.31  The states were left to their own devices about 
 
 25. Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 21. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.  For a good summary of the Export Clause, see ERIKA K. 
LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42780, EXPORT CLAUSE: LIMITATION ON 
CONGRESS’S TAXING POWER (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42780.pdf. 
 27. See United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 846 (1996) (“We have had 
few occasions to interpret the language of the Export Clause, but our cases have 
broadly exempted from federal taxation not only export goods, but also services and 
activities closely related to the export process.”). 
 28. Professor Edwin Seligman’s magisterial work on the history of the income tax is an 
excellent resource.  See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE 
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD (2d 
ed. 1914). 
 29. The Sixteenth Amendment’s history will be omitted, for it arose simply as a rejection 
of a turn-of-the-century Court decision.  See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 5 (“Pollock . 
. . was finally repudiated by the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.”); Jensen, supra note 
16, at 2343 (“The invalidation of the late-nineteenth-century income tax led, more or 
less directly, to the Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913[.]”). 
 30. Bullock, supra note 6, at 218. 
 31. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income 
Tax, 85 IOWA L. REV. 907, 912 (2000). 
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how to raise the money, leading to considerable divergence in tax 
collection regimes.32  The requisitions method was theoretically 
sound, but its enforcement was an entirely different matter.  The 
Confederation government “lacked both the political will to collect 
unpaid moneys from delinquent states and the coercive power to 
force states to comply.”33  States took full advantage of this 
weakness, and the collections rate overall amounted to a paltry thirty-
seven percent of the entire amount requisitioned during the 
Confederation government’s existence.34 
In light of the chronic failure of the central Confederation 
government to raise revenue, calls for a wholesale amendment to the 
Articles arose, culminating in what became the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.35  At the Convention, delegates spent much time 
debating the scope of the central government’s power.36  It was 
ultimately agreed that the general power of taxation should be 
defined broadly and include the ability to levy “taxes, duties, imposts, 
and excises”—all the common names of taxes then known.37   
The prohibition on export taxes was auspicious.  The natural 
benefits to a manufacturing economy aside, the South was concerned 
that any taxes on exports would more seriously injure the Southern 
states’ economies than those of the North—that the value of slaves 
“might be decreased by export duties on the peculiar products of 
slave labor.”38  Massachusetts and Connecticut agreed, more because 
their economies relied on shipping than on any particular concerns 
over slavery.39  A related provision is the uniformity requirement for 
duties, imposts, and excises, motivated by the concerns of several 
states that the central government might favor the ports of certain 
states over others.40 
The origin of the direct tax clauses was more complex than that of 
the rest and linked to the intractable question of slavery.41  One of the 
 
 32. Id. at 912–13. 
 33. Id. at 913. 
 34. Id. at 913–14. 
 35. See id. at 915–16. 
 36. See id. at 916–17 (discussing debates among the delegates regarding the proposed 
methods through which the central government would collect taxes from the states). 
 37. Bullock, supra note 6, at 222–23. 
 38. Id. at 225–26. 
 39. RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 319 (1st ed. 2009); Bullock, supra note 6, at 226. 
 40. Bullock, supra note 6, at 227. 
 41. Id. at 230.  Some commentators, however, dispute that the direct tax clauses had their 
genesis in the slavery question.  E.g., Arthur C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the 
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major obstacles facing the convention was how to proportion 
representation of states in the federal government.  States with 
sizeable slave populations wanted all slaves counted for purposes of 
representation, whereas free states urged the opposite, contending 
that no slaves should be counted in determining representation.42  The 
delegates deadlocked as proposal after proposal was defeated.43  The 
watershed moment came when Gouverneur Morris proposed that 
taxation be in proportion to representation, thereby reducing both the 
South’s incentive to count all slaves and the North’s opposition to 
admitting some form of additional representation on the basis of slave 
populations.44  Addressing the criticism that this would represent a 
return to requisitions, Morris suggested that apportionment be limited 
to direct taxes, which he understood to be those taxes other than on 
exports, imports, and consumption.45  The motion was passed 
unanimously and became the direct tax clause in Article I, section 2.46 
The history of the other direct tax clause, in Article I, section 9, 
referring explicitly to apportionment per the results of a census, is 
even more curious.  The South was concerned that until the first 
census was conducted, the federal government might conduct an 
arbitrary population estimate and put an undue burden on slave 
states.47  It was therefore proposed to limit capitation taxes until the 
census could be carried out.48  This proposal was adopted, with a later 
amendment under which the restriction on capitation taxes was 
extended to all taxes, apparently to prevent readjustments of states’ 
burdens under past requisitions of the Confederation government.49 
II. CASES INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION’S TAX 
PROVISIONS 
The Supreme Court has provided a considerable body of 
jurisprudence interpreting the Constitution’s tax clauses, with the 
 
Income Tax Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 19 YALE L.J. 505, 510–11, 513–
14 (1910). 
 42. See Bullock, supra note 6, at 232–34. 
 43. See id. at 232–33. 
 44. Id. at 233–34.  It has been suggested that “[a]pportionment by population was treated 
in the debates as merely a measure of wealth when no other measure was feasible.”  
Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of 
Direct Tax, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 303 (2004). 
 45. Bullock, supra note 6, at 234. 
 46. Id. at 234, 237. 
 47. Id. at 238–39. 
 48. Id. at 238. 
 49. Id. at 238–39. 
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bulk dating from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  As the 
judicial furor over the Sixteenth Amendment settled by the 1930s, tax 
clause challenges became less frequent.  From the 1990s on, there has 
been a mild revival of interest in constitutional tax issues, though 
little attention is devoted to them outside of a small niche in 
academia.50  This Article’s conclusions rely on a close examination of 
the Supreme Court’s case law—and its evolution through time—
interpreting the Constitution’s direct and indirect tax provisions and 
several corollary issues.  The survey is split into four sections: the 
first addresses cases interpreting the direct tax provisions before the 
Sixteenth Amendment51; the second, as a continuation of the first, 
reviews those cases that follow the Amendment’s ratification;52 the 
third and fourth look to cases examining the Uniformity and Export 
Clauses, respectively.53   
Hopefully, future scholars will benefit from this chronological 
overview of constitutional common law.  The most important cases 
are discussed individually in the text, each beginning with a short 
summation of its holding.  The curious reader can find many 
additional cases in the footnotes.  The reader short on time may 
decide, at least initially, to skip the detailed survey of cases and go 
directly to the summary at the end of this Part II,54 before continuing 
on to Part III, which proposes a constitutional model for classifying 
taxes,55 and Part IV, which applies that model to several types of 
taxes that have been proposed—and might be considered in the 
future—to address the continuing national revenue gap.56  The author 
hopes that such a reader will then return to this case survey in order 
to more fully understand the Supreme Court decisions that form the 
basis of the constitutional model proposed below. 
A. Cases Interpreting the Direct Tax Clauses 
The constitutional rule for direct taxes states that such levies must 
be apportioned based on population.57  Notwithstanding the 
 
 50. See Erik M. Jensen, Post-NFIB: Does the Taxing Clause Give Congress Unlimited 
Power?, 136 TAX NOTES 1309, 1314 (Sept. 10, 2012) (“For the three of us in the 
world who care about the direct-tax apportionment rule . . . .”). 
 51. See infra Part II.A. 
 52. See infra Part II.B. 
 53. See infra Parts II.C, II.D. 
 54. See infra Part II.E. 
 55. See infra Part III. 
 56. See infra Part IV.  
 57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless 
in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).  
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conceptual simplicity of the apportionment requirement, the Court 
has long struggled to define what types of taxes are in fact subject to 
it.58  The Founding Fathers did not have a monolithic definition of 
direct taxes in their minds when they were drafting the Constitution.59  
As history has shown, an ambiguous constitutional provision is often 
the fountainhead of endless court challenges, which has been the 
situation with direct taxes, as the following cases demonstrate. 
Hylton v. United States – 1796 
Holding: an annual tax on carriages is a duty.60  Justice 
Chase concludes that direct taxes encompass capitations and 
taxes on land.61  Justice Paterson finds that direct taxes also 
include general personal property assessments.62 
The best place to start the survey is from the beginning.  Hylton 
was the first case to interpret direct taxes and is notable for its time 
period and the men involved, such as Alexander Hamilton, who 
argued on behalf of the United States.63  The case was decided in 
1796, when George Washington was still president, and the 
Constitutional Convention a recent memory.  Three of the four 
justices who heard the case had been delegates to the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention.64  And although their decision is not 
beyond challenge,65 it is an important Founding-era judicial 
interpretation on this question. 
At issue in Hylton was whether an annual tax on carriages was 
direct, which would require that it be apportioned.66  The Court 
delivered its opinion seriatim, as was the custom at the time, inherited 
from the British appellate courts.  The justices held unanimously that 
the tax was indirect.67 
 
 58. See Campbell, supra note 6, at 111. 
 59. See Ackerman, supra note 20, at 4 (“[T]he Founders didn’t have a very clear sense of 
what they were doing in carving out a distinct category of ‘direct’ taxes for special 
treatment.”). 
 60. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 176–77 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 63. J.H. Riddle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of a Direct Tax, 15 MICH. L. REV. 566, 567 
(1917). 
 64. Those were Justices Wilson, Paterson, and Chase.  Ackerman, supra note 20, at 21. 
 65. See id. at 22 (“Chase and Iredell were strong nationalists, and so their opinions 
upholding a uniform national tax might not be too surprising.”). 
 66. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 172–73 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 67. Id. at 172–84. 
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Justice Chase, first to deliver his opinion, identified several types of 
taxes for constitutional purposes: direct taxes subject to 
apportionment; duties, imposts, and excises subject to uniformity; 
and taxes that are neither direct, nor duties, imposts, or excises, and 
thus subject to neither restriction.68  He posited that there might also 
be a tax simultaneously direct and indirect, although he could offer 
no examples of such a tax.69  He considered rhetorically: “[W]ould 
Congress be prohibited from laying such a tax, because it is partly a 
direct tax?”70  Answering in the negative, he observed that such a tax 
would be deemed entirely indirect:  “The Constitution evidently 
contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as Congress 
could lay in proportion to the census.”71  It would be inequitable for 
states of like population but different numbers of carriages to be 
apportioned an equal tax burden, such that the per-carriage incidence 
of the tax would vary among the states. 
Chase concluded that an annual tax on carriages is properly 
classified as a duty, which he understood to include such items as 
stamp taxes, passage tolls, and numerous others.72  An annual 
carriage tax is a tax on a “consumable commodity,” a tax that is 
indirect and on the owner’s expense.73  Chase then reasoned in dicta 
“that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, 
to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, 
profession, or any other circumstances; and a tax on LAND.”74  He 
doubted whether “a general assessment of personal property, within 
the United States, is included within the term direct tax.”75  With 
direct taxes including only capitations and taxes on realty, the 
carriage tax could be nothing but indirect. 
Justice Paterson, next to deliver his opinion, observed that, 
although the case hinges on definitions, there is no clear 
 
 68. Id. at 172–74 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 69. Id. at 174. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 175. 
 73. Id.  What Justice Chase means here by a “consumeable commodity” is unclear.  John 
Locke understood “consumable commodities” to be those capable of being 
consumed—what are today known as consumables.  Carriages, however, are durable 
goods.  Chase perhaps intended that carriages were goods that depreciated with time, 
such that they were eventually “consumed,” and indeed the passage from Adam Smith 
quoted by Justice Paterson later suggests that consumable commodities include both 
durable (i.e., capital) and consumable goods.  Id. at 180–81 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 74. Id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 75. Id. 
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understanding of the meanings of “duty” and “excise.”76  The 
Founding Fathers intended that Congress “should possess full power 
over every species of taxable property, except exports.”77  The term 
“taxes” in the Constitution is generic, describing all levies that could 
conceivably be enacted, vesting in Congress a plenary taxation 
authority.78  Taxes can be divided into direct (explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution) and indirect (inferred from the Constitution by 
negative implication) varieties.  Duties, imposts, and excises are 
indirect and subject to uniformity.79  Paterson speculated that there 
might exist an indirect tax that is neither a duty nor an impost or 
excise.80  He suggested that such a tax should still be uniform but did 
not elaborate further.81  As to direct taxes, the Constitution describes 
capitations as direct, and Paterson observed that taxes on land are 
also deemed to be direct, both theoretically and practically.82  It was 
unclear whether taxes on the product of land were to be deemed 
direct or indirect, but the question was not at issue in Hylton, so 
Paterson noted it but did not examine it further.83  He did observe, 
disagreeing on this point with Chase, that if Congress were to enact 
an aggregate tax on “things that generally pervade all the states in the 
Union,” then that tax might be considered direct.84 
Paterson next stated that the rule of apportionment should not be 
extended by construction, as it was the product of compromise and 
otherwise “radically wrong,” not to “be supported by any solid 
reasoning,” because it treated slaves as a type of property represented 
more than other property.85  Moreover, a system relying heavily on 
apportionment would effectively constitute a return to the old 
requisitions scheme of the Articles of Confederation.86  
Apportionment would also result in similarly situated individuals in 
different states potentially paying different sums, leading to 
 
 76. Id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“What is the natural and common, or technical and 
appropriate, meaning of the words, duty and excise, it is not easy to ascertain.  They 
present no clear and precise idea to the mind.  Different persons will annex different 
significations to the terms.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 176–77. 
 84. Id. at 177. 
 85. Id. at 177–178. 
 86. See id. at 178; supra text accompanying notes 30–34. 
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uncertainty and undue administrative burdens for the states.  The 
Uniformity Clause was a simpler and more equitable rule.87  Paterson 
observed that apportionment is an operation on the states, involving 
arbitrary valuations and assessments, whereas uniformity is “an 
instant operation on individuals,” involving no intervening 
assessments.88  He concluded by observing that taxes on expenses and 
consumption are indirect, as they are “circuitous modes of reaching 
the revenue of individuals, who generally live according to their 
income.”89  Since a tax on carriages is a tax on expenses or 
consumption, it is indirect and not subject to apportionment. 
Justice Iredell authored the third and final substantive opinion in 
Hylton, disagreeing with the reasoning of both Chase and Paterson.  
Iredell affirmed that Congress has the plenary power to tax all taxable 
objects, excepting exports, subject to apportionment for direct taxes 
and uniformity for duties, imposts, and excises.90  He also noted that 
if an indirect tax is not a duty, impost, or excise, then it should still be 
subject to uniformity.91 
On the main question, Iredell argued that, “[a]s all direct taxes must 
be apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution contemplated none 
as direct but such as could be apportioned.”92  If a tax cannot be 
apportioned, then it is not a direct tax for constitutional purposes.  
Apportioning something like the carriage tax would lead to absurd 
results, with identical articles taxed at different rates in different 
states.93  If the incidence of a carriage tax were passed on to carriage 
owners, then between two states of comparable population, the one 
with the larger number of carriages would have a lower tax per 
capita.94  Alternative proposals for apportioning such a tax were also 
unworkable.95  In any case, a direct tax was one on “something 
inseparably annexed to the soil,” such as a land or poll tax.96 
 
 87. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180.  See also supra text accompanying notes 15–18 
(explaining the Constitution’s Uniformity Clause). 
 88. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 180 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 91. Id.  Justice Iredell’s reasoning on this point is not clear; he likely thought it contrary to 
the spirit of the Constitution to levy non-geographically uniform taxes on individuals.  
Id. at 181–83. 
 92. Id. at 181. 
 93. Id. at 181–82. 
 94. Id. at 182. 
 95. Id. at 182–83. 
 96. Id. at 183.  See also Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Oy Yes, the Healthcare Penalty 
is Unconstitutional, 129 TAX NOTES 725, 727–28 (Nov. 8, 2010) (examining critically 
whether Justice Iredell said what he meant in Hylton).  
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Loughborough v. Blake – 1820  
Holding: Congress may impose a direct tax on the District 
of Columbia or a territory, although it is not obligated to do 
so when it imposes such a tax on the states.97  If a direct tax 
is imposed on the District or territories, however, it must 
follow the rule of apportionment.98 
Although often ignored in discussions about direct taxation, 
Loughborough is nonetheless worthy of brief mention.  At issue was 
whether Congress could impose a direct tax on the District of 
Columbia and by extension other American territories not 
incorporated as states.99 
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, observed 
that Congress has a general power to levy taxes without geographical 
restriction.100  The Uniformity Clause requires uniformity 
“throughout the United States[,]” meaning that indirect taxes must be 
imposed in a like manner everywhere within the United States, 
including the District and territories.101  Since the power to lay direct 
taxes is coterminous with indirect taxes (though the mode of exercise 
is different), Congress has the power to impose direct taxes anywhere 
in the United States, including the District and other territories.102 
The exercise of the power of direct taxation is problematic as 
applied to the District and Territories, however, since the 
apportionment of direct taxes is governed by the results of a census, 
which is required to count only the population of the states and not 
the federal District.103  But when the census was conducted, the 
population of the District and the Territories could just as easily be 
counted in the same manner.104  And, although Congress cannot 
exempt any state from its apportioned direct tax burden, the terms of 
the Constitution addressing direct taxation confine this limitation to 
the states.105  Therefore, if Congress lays a direct tax, that tax must 
apply to all states, but Congress may choose whether to apply it to the 
 
 97. Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 325 (1820). 
 98. Id. at 322. 
 99. Id. at 318–19. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 318–19 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 
 102. Id. at 325. 
 103. Id. at 319–22. 
 104. Id. at 321–22. 
 105. Id. at 323. 
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District and territories.106  If Congress does elect to impose a direct 
tax in the District or Territories, it must be apportioned, for just as the 
uniformity requirement “secures the district from oppression in the 
imposition of indirect taxes,” the principle of apportionment secures 
“the district from any oppressive exercise of the power to lay and 
collect direct taxes.”107 
Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule – 1868  
Holding: a tax on the gross income of insurance companies 
is a duty or excise.108  Duties are things due and recoverable 
by law.109  Imposts are duties on imports.110  And excises are 
domestic taxes on the consumption of commodities or retail 
sales.111 
Following Loughborough, the Supreme Court remained silent on 
direct taxation questions for nearly 50 years until Pacific Insurance 
Company, a challenge to a wide-ranging internal revenue act enacted 
during the Civil War, which levied, among other exactions, a tax on 
the gross receipts of certain insurance companies.112 
Justice Swayne, writing for the Court, looked to Hylton for the 
proposition “that the [only] direct taxes contemplated by the 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 325. 
 108. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 434, 445 (1868). 
 109. Id. at 445 (citing 2 T.E. TOMLINS, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, 
PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE, OF THE ENGLISH LAW; DEFINING AND INTERPRETING 
THE TERMS OR WORDS OF ART; AND COMPRISING COPIOUS INFORMATION ON THE 
SUBJECTS OF LAW, TRADE, AND GOVERNMENT 330 (Philadelphia & New York, P. 
Byrne & I. Riley 1811)). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. (citing 1 JOSEPH BATEMAN, THE LAWS OF EXCISE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
EXISTING STATUTES RELATING TO THE REVENUE OF EXCISE; WITH PRACTICAL NOTES 
AND FORMS, AND AN APPENDIX OF SELECT CASES 9 (London, A. Maxwell & Son 
1843); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
COLONIES AND STATES, BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 953 (The 
Lawbook Exch., Ltd., 2d ed. 2009); 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 318 (Geo. T. Bisel Co. 1922); 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAW, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 242 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & 
Abraham Small 1803)). 
 112. Id. at 434. 
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Constitution” were capitations and taxes on land.113  However, 
dissatisfied with a cursory conclusion, he dissected the species of 
indirect taxes listed in the Uniformity Clause.  Citing Tomlin’s Law 
Dictionary, he defined duties as “things due and recoverable by 
law[,]” a definition broad enough to cover most taxes.114  A narrower 
meaning was sometimes imparted to duties, defining them as 
customs, and therefore synonymous with imposts.115  Justice Swayne 
defined imposts as duties on imported goods and merchandise, 
looking to James Madison, who had considered duties and imposts 
synonymous for constitutional purposes.116  A possible alternative 
view was that imposts cover every type of tax not deemed a “tax” or 
“excise.”117  Finally, according to Justice Swayne and the majority, an 
excise is “an inland imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of 
the commodity, and sometimes upon the retail sale; sometimes upon 
the manufacturer, and sometimes upon the vendor.”118 
With the exception of the apportionment and uniformity 
restrictions, as well as the ban on export taxes, “the exercise of the 
[taxing] power is, in all respects, unfettered.”119  If a tax on carriages 
held for private use was not direct, then a tax on the business of 
insurance companies could not be direct either.120  Apportioning the 
insurance company tax would be inequitable, as the burden would 
fall lightly in those states with many and wealthy corporations, not at 
all in those with no insurance companies, and most heavily in those 
with few and poor corporations.121  Justice Swayne argued that “[i]t 
cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended that 
any tax should be apportioned, the collection of which on that 
principle would be attended with such results.”122  The insurance 
company revenue tax therefore could be nothing but a duty or 
excise—indirect and not subject to apportionment. 
 
 113. Id. at 444–45 (quoting Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) 
(opinion of Chase, J.)). 
 114. Id. at 445 (citing TOMLINS, supra note 109, at 330). 
 115. Id. (citing TOMLINS, supra note 109, at 330; STORY, supra note 111, at § 952; Hylton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.)). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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Veazie Bank v. Fenno – 1869  
Holding: a tax on state bank note circulation is a duty.123  
Affirming Justice Paterson’s view in Hylton that direct taxes 
are capitations, taxes on land, and general personal property 
assessments.124 
A year after deciding Pacific Insurance Company, the Supreme 
Court again took up the issue of direct taxation in Veazie Bank v. 
Fenno.  At issue was the constitutionality of a federal tax on the 
circulation of notes and bills issued by entities other than national 
banking associations, imposed to discourage state-issued notes.125 
Chief Justice Chase (not the same Chase as in Hylton), writing for 
the Court, noted the difficulty of accurately defining the terms used in 
the Constitution to describe the congressional taxing power.126  The 
general intent of the Constitutional Convention was to create a strong 
federal taxing power, encompassing the taxation of everything but 
exports, with “certain virtual limitations, arising from the principles 
of the Constitution itself[,]” primarily that the federal government 
cannot tax “to impair the separate existence and independent self-
government of the States,” nor can it tax to achieve “ends 
inconsistent with the limited grants of power in the Constitution.”127  
To this end, the uniformity and apportionment requirements were not 
restrictions but directions on the mode of exercising the taxing 
power.128 
Chase dismissed political economists’ definitions of direct taxes as 
irrelevant to the constitutional understanding of the term and turned 
instead to the historical evidence of how Congress understood direct 
taxes when it legislated apportioned taxes.129  Through 1869, there 
were five instances of Congress levying apportioned taxes, with each 
instance a one-time gross levy apportioned among the states based on 
population.130  In these instances, Congress consistently limited direct 
 
 123. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869). 
 124. Id. at 544–46. 
 125. Id. at 539–40. 
 126. Id. at 540. 
 127. Id. at 540–41. 
 128. Id. at 541. 
 129. Id. at 541–42. 
 130. Bullock, supra note 6, at 470–74 (1900).  The 1815 and 1861 levies had been made 
annual but were later repealed and suspended, respectively, such that they were in 
effect for only one year.  Either way, the levies appear to have been ineffective at 
raising revenue.  Id.  
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taxes to those on land, appurtenances, and capitation.131  
Contrariwise, “personal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, 
have never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct 
tax.”132  Chief Justice Chase concluded that this practical construction 
by Congress was entitled to considerable deference, especially in the 
absence of any contrary evidence in the discussions of the 
Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions.133 
Chief Justice Chase thus affirmed Hylton, holding that direct taxes 
are: (1) capitation taxes, (2) taxes on land, and (3) possibly taxes on 
all personal property by general valuation.134  All other taxes are 
indirect—duties, imposts, and excises—and subject to the rule of 
geographical uniformity.135  The tax on bank note circulation most 
closely fits the category of duty, similarly to the tax on insurance 
company income analyzed by the Court the prior year in Pacific 
Insurance Company.136 
Scholey v. Rew – 1874  
Holding: an inheritance tax is an excise or duty.137  
Occupational and license fees may be a form of indirect tax, 
separate from duties, imposts, and excises.138 
Several years after Veazie Bank, the Supreme Court again 
confronted the direct tax question in Scholey, where at issue was a tax 
applicable when a person became beneficially entitled to real estate 
or income from real estate upon the death of a decedent.139  
 
 131. Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 542–43.  In 1798 ($2 million), 1813 ($3 million), 
1815 ($6 million), and 1816 ($3 million), the tax was levied upon lands, 
improvements, dwelling-houses, and slaves.  Id.  In 1861, a $20 million tax was levied 
upon lands, improvements, and dwelling-houses only.  Id.  The 1798 tax treated the 
slave component as a capitation, while the remainder of the Antebellum taxes treated 
slaves as a part of realty.  Id. at 543. 
 132. Id. at 543. 
 133. Id. at 544. 
 134. Id. at 546.  The Court here evidently favored Justice Paterson’s view of a broadly 
based personal property tax as a direct tax, over that of Chase.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 75, 84. 
 135. Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 546. 
 136. Id. at 546–47. 
 137. Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 346–47 (1874). 
 138. Id. at 348. 
 139. Id. at 346. 
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Justice Clifford, writing for the Court, determined that the tax was 
an excise or duty and thus indirect.140  Although he affirmed the 
Hylton Court’s land tax–or–capitation definition of a direct tax, he 
reasoned that the exaction was not a tax on land but a tax on the 
transfer of land.141  The tax only applied when the successor’s interest 
in real estate vested upon the death of a predecessor.142  “[I]n other 
words,” he opined, “it is the right to become the successor of real 
estate upon the death of the predecessor” that triggers the tax.143 
Justice Clifford observed that it was not necessary to determine 
whether a direct tax included exactions other than taxes on land or 
capitations.144  However, “it is expressly decided that the term does 
not include the tax on income, which cannot be distinguished in 
principle from a succession tax. . . .”145  In other words, an inheritance 
tax is in principle similar to an income tax, which had been found 
indirect in Pacific Insurance Company.  Justice Clifford also noted 
that the government could draw revenue from: 
 
[Exactions in] the form of duties, imposts, or excises, or 
they may also assume the form of license fees for 
permission to carry on particular occupations or to enjoy 
special franchises, or they may be specific in form, as when 
levied upon corporations in reference to the amount of 
capital stock or to the business done or profits earned by the 
individual or corporation.146 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 346–47. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 347. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 347–48. 
 146. Id. at 348.  Contra United States v. Vassar (License Tax Cases) 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 
471 (1886) (stating that a license grant “must be regarded as nothing more than a mere 
form of imposing a tax”).  Under Justice Clifford’s definition, none of the exactions 
listed would qualify as a direct tax, so he must be suggesting that license fees, capital 
stock levies, and income taxes are indirect.  This of course raises the question of 
whether these exactions are to be understood as separate from duties, imposts, and 
excises, in which case they would be exempt from the uniformity requirement.  
Pacific Insurance Co. determined that corporate income taxes are duties or excises, 
and Justice Clifford here invoked the same reasoning.  See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 
U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 445 (1868).  Almost certainly he understood capital stock levies 
and income taxes to fall under the umbrella of duties, imposts, and excises.  On the 
other hand, he seemed to indicate fairly explicitly (exactions “may also assume the 
form of license fees . . . .”) that occupational and franchise license fees would be a 
category in addition to duties, imposts, and excises.  He does not offer any further 
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Springer v. United States – 1881  
Holding: an income tax is an excise or duty.147 
Justice Swayne, delivering the Court’s unanimous opinion, 
examined in Springer whether a Civil War-era tax on income, gains, 
and profits was direct.148  He began his analysis with the history of 
the direct tax provisions, relating the almost serendipitous way in 
which Gouverneur Morris’s suggestion for a direct tax limitation was 
incorporated as part of a compromise on representation in the 
Constitutional Convention.149  Swayne also looked to Alexander 
Hamilton’s thoughts in Federalist Papers No. 21 and 36, in which 
Hamilton had written that direct taxes are principally those on real 
property and capitations.150  Hamilton argued similarly in his briefs 
for Hylton, although he also added to direct taxes the category of 
general assessments (taxes levied on the whole property of 
individuals or upon their entire real or personal estate).151  Levied 
only on a part of a taxpayer’s personal estate, the income tax at issue 
could not be a general assessment and did not fall into any of the 
other direct tax categories.152 
Examining the taxes that Congress treated as direct, Justice Swayne 
found, as the Court did in Veazie Bank, that the only direct taxes 
imposed by Congress and identified as such had been on real estate 
and slaves.153  He affirmed that such a “uniform practical construction 
of the Constitution touching so important a point, through so long a 
period, by the legislative and executive departments of the 
government, though not conclusive, is a consideration of great 
weight.”154  Looking to Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of 
direct taxation, he found like interpretations, with contemporary 
treatises on constitutional law and taxation offering no dissent.155  
 
explanation, and this ambiguity is likely a case of careless drafting.  Scholey, 90 U.S. 
at 348. 
 147. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880). 
 148. Id. at 592. 
 149. Id. at 596. 
 150. Id. at 596–97. 
 151. Id. at 597–98. 
 152. Id. at 598. 
 153. Id. at 598–99; see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 542–43 (1869). 
 154. Springer, 102 U.S. at 599. 
 155. Id. at 602.  Justice Story, cited by Justice Swayne here, had posited that direct taxes 
include taxes on land or real property, and that indirect taxes include taxes on 
consumption.  Id. (citing STORY, supra note 111, at § 950).  
76 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 45 
Accordingly, “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, 
are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes 
on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error 
complains is within the category of an excise or duty.”156 
Pollock I – 1895  
Holding: a tax on rents or other income from real estate is 
direct.157 
Following Springer, slightly more than a decade had passed before 
the Supreme Court again heard a case on direct taxation.  That case, 
Pollock, represented such a watershed moment that it is typical to 
divide direct tax jurisprudence into pre- and post-Pollock eras.158  In 
Pollock, a broadly based income tax was challenged on the grounds 
that, by taxing the income or rents of real estate, the law taxed the 
real estate itself.159  Likewise, by taxing the interest or other income 
from bonds and other income-producing personal property, the law 
taxed directly the personal estate itself.160 
Chief Justice Fuller, delivering the Court’s opinion, observed that 
the Founding Fathers, in writing the Constitution, “had just emerged 
from the struggle for independence whose rallying cry had been that 
‘taxation and representation go together.’”161  After an examination of 
the federal system of government and the constitutional system of 
taxation, Fuller noted in passing that if there were an indirect tax that 
was not a duty, impost, or excise, then it had remained undiscovered 
“for more than one hundred years of national existence,” expressing 
skepticism but not outright dismissal of the idea.162 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 580–81, vacated, 158 
U.S. 601 (1895).  See also Hyde v. Cont’l Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 654 (1895) (incorporating 
by reference the opinion, concurrence, and dissents from Pollock I).  There are in fact 
two Pollock opinions, issued within months of each other.  The first decision found 
the justices of the Supreme Court deadlocked at 4–4 on several key issues, which led 
the Court to rehear the case a month later.  Although the two Pollock cases are often 
taken together, for the sake of chronology, they are treated separately here. 
 158. E.g., Jensen, supra note 16, at 2350.  The Pollock I case had overtones of what today 
would be called ‘class conflict,’ animated as the debate was in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries by the rise of socialism and communism.  See Sheldon D. Pollack, 
Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894-1913, 66 TAX LAW. 295, 301–06 (2013).   
 159. Pollock I, 157 U.S. at 431–32. 
 160. See id. at 432–33. 
 161. Id. at 555–56. 
 162. Id. at 557. 
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On the direct tax question, Fuller stated that indirect taxes 
economically are those which can be shifted to another person or 
avoided, while direct taxes are taxes on one’s real or personal estate 
or the income therefrom that cannot be avoided.163  However, 
acknowledging that the constitutional definition may be different, he 
examined the Founding Fathers’ understanding of direct taxes.164  
Fuller ultimately concurred with Albert Gallatin’s assessment from 
1796 that “[t]he most generally received opinion . . . is, that by direct 
taxes in the constitution, those are meant which are raised on the 
capital or revenue of the peop[le]; by indirect, such as are raised on 
their expense.”165  The justices in Hylton had expressed doubt about 
whether a direct tax included anything beyond a capitation or a land 
tax, but avoided expressly deciding the question.166  Moreover, 
British law had always classified income taxes as direct, and the 
expectation was that direct taxation would be levied only in exigent 
circumstances, which had held true until the 1894 income tax.167  All 
the direct taxation cases following Hylton had conceded that taxes on 
land are direct, and none had determined that rents or income derived 
from land are not taxes on land.168  Citing the common law principle 
that land is nothing but the profits that may be derived therefrom, 
Fuller held that “[a]n annual tax upon the annual value or annual user 
of real estate[,]” which is without question a direct tax, “appears to us 
the same in substance as an annual tax on the real estate, which 
would be paid out of the rent or income.”169  As substance controls 
and not form, the income tax law, insofar as it levied “a tax on the 
rents or income of real estate,” violated the Constitution.170  The 
Court was evenly split on the severability of constitutional provisions 
from those held unconstitutional,171 a deadlock that paved the way to 
a rehearing and second opinion in Pollock II a month later. 
 
 163. Id. at 558. 
 164. See generally id. at 558–70. 
 165. Id. at 569. 
 166. See id. at 571–72. 
 167. Id. at 572–74. 
 168. Id. at 579. 
 169. Id. at 581. 
 170. Id. at 583. 
 171. Id. at 586. 
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Pollock II – 1895  
Holding: a tax on real or personal property, or a tax on the 
income from such, is direct.172  Duties are taxes on the 
import, export, or consumption of goods.  Imposts are 
indirect taxes generally.  Excises are taxes on goods or 
licenses.173 
After a rehearing and change of opinion by one of the justices, the 
Court issued a second opinion in Pollock, also written by Chief 
Justice Fuller, which again was met with vigorous dissents from four 
justices.  The goal of the rehearing was to address the arguments on 
which the Court initially had been evenly split.174  Pointing out that 
the Court’s previous “conclusions remained unchanged,” Fuller noted 
that, just like a person’s income derived from rents or products of real 
property is direct, so too is income derived from personal property, 
including bonds, stocks, and other such forms, finding support in the 
natural meaning of the words used to delineate the constitutional 
taxation powers and the historical circumstances surrounding the 
Constitutional Convention.175  Fuller asserted that the limitation on 
direct taxes was designed to constrain the taxation power, delegated 
as it was by the states to the federal government.176  It could not be 
that direct taxation was “restricted in one breath, and the restriction 
blown to the winds in another.”177 
Fuller relied on the commentary of several legal experts to derive 
definitions of the various types of indirect taxes.  Looking to 
Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional Treatise, he 
observed that a “duty” is a tax imposed on the import, export, “or 
consumption of goods;” a “custom” is a duty on imports or exports 
only; an “impost” can be any tax, tribute, or duty, although it is 
generally applied to indirect taxes only;178 and an “excise” is an 
inland impost on goods and “licenses to pursue certain trades or to 
 
 172. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 617. 
 175. Id. at 617–19. 
 176. Id. at 621 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819)). 
 177. Id. at 622. 
 178. Id.  This definition of impost differs from that advanced in an earlier case, where the 
issue arose in the context of the constitutional prohibition on state taxation of imports 
and exports.  There, “impost, or duty on imports,” was defined as “a custom or a tax 
levied on articles brought into a country,” which could be levied either before or after 
“the importer is allowed to exercise his rights of ownership over [the goods 
imported.]”  Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 437 (1827). 
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deal” in commodities.179  Fuller also looked approvingly to Justice 
Story’s view that “duties” in the Constitution are used equivalently to 
“customs” and “imposts.”180   
Fuller stated that Hylton was “badly reported,” omitting certain key 
reasoning, such as that the case turned not on the issue of direct 
taxation specifically but whether the carriage tax was an excise.181  It 
had not been stated explicitly in Hylton, but Hamilton had argued in 
that case that a general assessment, be it upon an individual’s entire 
property or real or personal estate, is also a direct tax.182  Thus, “a 
general unapportioned tax, imposed upon all property owners as a 
body for or in respect of their property,” must be direct.183   
Just as the income from real property cannot be regarded in 
isolation, neither can the income from personal property.184  It was 
not dispositive on the issue that Congress had not included personal 
property in its prior apportioned taxes.185  Income, once generated, 
may be severed from the property from whence it came, but it cannot 
be taxed where the source cannot be.186  If there is no power to tax 
real and personal property without apportionment, the same 
restriction ought to apply to the income generated therefrom.187  In 
England, the income tax had always been regarded as direct.188  Even 
assuming that an income tax was not contemplated by the Founding 
Fathers, which is unlikely,189 it cannot be taken out of the 
constitutional rule.  Although an income tax levy may give rise to 
inconveniences, it can be apportioned, even if that apportionment 
may operate unequally.190  In a challenge that would ultimately be 
met within twenty years, Fuller noted that the Constitution allows for 
 
 179. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 622. 
 180. Id. (citing STORY, supra note 111, at § 952). 
 181. Id. at 626–27. 
 182. Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429, 572 (quoting 7 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 332 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1886)), vacated, 158 U.S. 601 
(1895). 
 183. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 627. 
 184. Id. at 628. 
 185. Id. at 629. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 630. 
 188. Id.  
 189. The first general income tax was introduced in England in 1799, more than a decade 
after American independence, although some partial forms of income taxes were 
known to exist much earlier.  Indeed, at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, taxes 
were levied in many states on incomes from professions, business, and employment.  
Id. at 630–32. 
 190. Id. at 633. 
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amendment, and if the desire is strong to tax income from real and 
personal property without apportionment, that route is available.191 
Holding that a tax on income arising from both real and personal 
property (as with a tax on the real and personal property itself) is 
direct, Fuller turned to severability.192  Gains and profits from 
business, privileges, and employment had always been deemed to be 
excises, and there was no reason to doubt that interpretation.193  
However, with the income tax stricken out of the law as it applied to 
income from real and personal property, the largest portion of the 
anticipated revenue was eliminated.194  This left “the burden of the 
tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations; 
and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain, 
in substance, a tax on occupations and labor.”195  Since the law 
imposed the income tax in a single scheme of taxation, and because 
of the severe burdens that would be imposed if parts of the income 
tax were left to stand, Fuller determined that the entire income tax 
must be stricken.196 
Nicol v. Ames – 1899  
Holding: a stamp tax on sales at exchanges is a duty or 
excise, and it is uniform, because it applies equally to all 
users of exchange facilities without regard to geography.197  
A general sales tax, however, would be a direct tax on 
property.198 
Several years after Pollock, the Court again confronted the 
definition of a direct tax in Nicol, where it addressed the 
constitutionality of a stamp tax levied on sales of merchandise at 
exchanges and boards of trade.199  Justice Peckham, writing for the 
Court, observed that in analyzing a tax’s validity, it is the tax’s 
practical effect that is most important, rather than “the purely 
 
 191. Id. at 635. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 637. 
 195. Id.  For an article by a contemporary reflecting on the injustices of apportionment and 
criticizing the expanded Pollock definition of direct taxes, see Bullock, supra note 6, 
at 465–81. 
 196. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 637. 
 197. Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 519–21 (1899). 
 198. Id. at 518. 
 199. Id. at 514. 
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economic or theoretical nature of the tax.”200  The primary argument 
against the stamp tax in question was that it was a tax on the sale of 
property measured by the value of the thing sold, making it a direct 
tax upon the property itself.201  Peckham held that the tax was not 
“upon the business itself which is so transacted,” but rather “a duty 
upon the facilities made use of, and actually employed, in the 
transaction of the business, and separate and apart from the business 
itself.”202  The purpose was to exact a levy for the privilege of doing 
business at exchanges and boards of trade.203  The fact that it was not 
capable of being shifted was irrelevant, since the tax was an indirect 
duty or excise.204  However, “[a] tax upon the privilege of selling 
property at the exchange, and of thus using the facilities there offered 
in accomplishing the sale, differs radically from a tax upon every sale 
made in any place.  The latter tax is really and practically upon 
property.”205  Peckham dismissed allegations that the tax was not 
uniform, concluding that it was valid under any possible definition of 
uniformity, since it was geographically uniform and otherwise 
equally applied to all who used the facilities offered at exchanges.206 
Knowlton v. Moore – 1900  
Holding: a succession tax is a duty or excise.207 
A year after Nicol, the Supreme Court considered in Knowlton the 
validity of a succession tax on legacies and distributive shares of 
personal property.208  Justice White, writing the Court’s opinion, 
observed that death duties relate not to the property itself but to the 
act of transferring that property by will or descent.209  Death duties 
had always been considered different from taxes on property, and 
succession taxes were always treated as duties—i.e. indirect.210  
 
 200. Id. at 513, 515–16. 
 201. Id. at 514, 518. 
 202. Id. at 519. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. at 520. 
 205. Id. at 521. 
 206. Id. at 522. 
 207. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78–79, 83 (1900).  As the Court explained, a 
probate duty is one charged upon the entire estate, a legacy duty is one “charged upon 
each legacy or distributive share of [personal property], and a succession duty [is one] 
charged against each interest in real property.”  Id. at 51. 
 208. Id. at 43, 46. 
 209. Id. at 43, 47. 
 210. Id. at 78. 
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Pointing to Scholey, and refuting the argument that Pollock overruled 
it, White concluded that the succession tax was an indirect duty or 
excise.211  He also refuted the argument that, since the succession tax 
was not capable of being shifted, it must be direct.212  The 
“shiftability theory” advocated by some economists had never been 
adopted by the court as the basis of direct tax classification, which 
relies on specific constitutional meanings.213 
Patton v. Brady – 1902  
Holding: a tobacco tax is an excise.214  An excise can be 
defined as a tax (1) levied on articles intended for 
consumption, and (2) imposed between the beginning of 
manufacture and final consumption.215 
In Patton, the Supreme Court addressed whether a tax on 
manufactured tobacco held by dealers was an excise.216  Justice 
Brewer, writing for the Court, found that it was.  Referring to the 
definition of excise by commentators and dictionaries, and 
considering governmental practice in levying excises, he deduced a 
two-part definition of such a tax.  An excise is a tax (1) levied “upon 
goods intended for consumption,” and (2) imposed at some point 
“intermediate the beginning of manufacture or production and the act 
of consumption.”217  A tobacco tax was an indirect excise under any 
definition, for “it is not a tax upon property as such, but upon certain 
kinds of property, having reference to their origin and their intended 
use.”218  Further, the power to impose excise taxes is not exhausted 
once exercised, so that goods and property are generally not immune 
from double taxation.219 
 
 211. Id. at 81.  The Court affirmed the Pollock holding as prohibiting a tax “imposed upon 
property solely by reason of its ownership[.]”  Id.  As to the succession tax, the Court 
understood it to apply to the privilege of transmitting property at death, and not to a 
claimed right of transmission, which would have suggested a tax on property because 
of ownership.  Some commentators critique the post-Pollock cases for errantly reading 
the “solely by reason of its ownership” language into Pollock.  E.g., Riddle, supra 
note 63, at 571. 
 212. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 81–82. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 615, 623 (1902). 
 215. Id. at 617. 
 216. Id. at 615. 
 217. Id. at 617. 
 218. Id. at 619. 
 219. Id. at 621–22. 
2015 Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes 83 
 
Thomas v. United States – 1904  
Holding: a tax on the sale of stock certificates is indirect.220  
Duties, imposts, and excises elude precise definition and 
likely cover all indirect taxes.221 
Thomas is a typical case for the period where, in the light of 
Pollock’s expansive definition of direct taxation, courts frequently 
faced the argument that since the right of transfer is an inherent 
attribute of property, a tax upon such a transfer was substantially a 
levy on the property itself and so a direct tax requiring 
apportionment.222  In Thomas, at issue was a stamp tax imposed on 
agreements of sale of stock certificates.223  Chief Justice Fuller, 
writing for the Court, noted that there are two broad classes of 
levies—”taxes” and “duties, imposts, and excises”—which 
“apparently embrace all forms of taxation contemplated by the 
Constitution.”224  Although duties, imposts, and excises escape 
precise definition, these terms “were used comprehensively to cover 
customs and excise duties imposed on importation, consumption, 
manufacture, and sale of certain commodities, privileges, particular 
business transactions, vocations, occupations, and the like”—in other 
words, indirect taxes.225  The stamp duty in question was contingent 
upon a sale of stock, a business transaction “in the exercise of the 
privilege afforded by the laws in respect to corporations of disposing 
of property in the form of certificates[,]” where “the element of 
absolute and unavoidable demand is lacking.”226  The tax, as with 
stamp taxes generally, was therefore indirect.227 
Spreckels Sugar Refining Company v. McClain – 1904  
Holding: a gross annual receipts tax on companies is an 
excise.228 
 
 220. Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370–71 (1904). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 370. 
 224. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 371. 
 227. Id. at 370–71. 
 228. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 412–13 (1904). 
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Spreckels Sugar Refining Company saw a challenge to a tax on the 
gross annual receipts above $250,000 of petroleum and sugar refining 
companies.229  Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, observed that 
“the tax is not imposed upon gross annual receipts as property, but 
only in respect of the carrying on or doing the business of refining 
sugar.”230  Moreover, Congress called the tax a “special excise,” 
which served at least partially to elucidate its intent.231  The Court’s 
past decisions were in accord with holding the tax an excise, and 
there was no need to reexamine the grounds upon which those 
judgments rested.232 
Flint v. Stone Tracy Company – 1911  
Holding: a tax on a corporation’s business, measured as a 
percentage of its income, is an excise.233  “[D]uties, imposts, 
and excises are generally treated as embracing the indirect 
forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution.”234 
Flint examined the validity of a “special excise tax” on the business 
of corporations, levied at a rate of one percent upon the entire net 
income over $5,000 from all sources.235  Justice Day, writing for the 
Court, noted that, while the statutory classification of a tax is not 
entirely dispositive, it “is entitled to much weight.”236  Justice Day 
distinguished Pollock on the grounds that there, the tax “was imposed 
upon property simply because of its ownership[,]” whereas in the 
instant case, the tax was occasioned upon the “carrying on or doing 
of business in the designated [corporate] capacity[.]”237  The 
difference between “mere ownership of property” and the “actual 
doing of business in a certain way” was substantive.238  Duties, 
imposts, and excises were generally considered to embrace all forms 
of indirect taxes.239  Thomas Cooley’s constitutional treatise 
distinguished duties and imposts as levies on import and export, 
whereas excises could be understood as (1) manufacture, sale, and 
 
 229. Id. at 410–11 (quoting Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464). 
 230. Id. at 405, 411. 
 231. Id. at 411 (quoting Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448, 464). 
 232. Id. at 411–12. 
 233. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 145–46, 151–52 (1911). 
 234. Id. at 151. 
 235. Id. at 142, 145–46. 
 236. Id. at 142, 145. 
 237. Id. at 150. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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consumption taxes, (2) occupational license taxes, and (3) taxes upon 
corporate privileges.240  The corporate tax could be described best as 
“an excise upon the particular privilege of doing business in a 
corporate capacity,” where the “element of absolute and unavoidable 
demand is lacking.”241  It could be measured validly by the income of 
a corporation, even if part of it originated from property that itself 
would be considered non-taxable or property not actively used in the 
business.242 
B. Cases Interpreting Direct Taxes in Consideration of the Sixteenth 
Amendment 
The Sixteenth Amendment indelibly altered the nature of inquiries 
into the definition of direct taxes.243  The Supreme Court cases 
following the Amendment’s ratification in 1913 merit treatment in a 
separate section, for they inevitably rely on the changes it wrought to 
the constitutional structure of taxation.  It is difficult to separate the 
legal analyses of the meaning of direct taxation from those of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, since both are necessarily intertwined.244  
Whereas before 1913 the Constitution recognized direct and indirect 
taxes as the two primary analytical categories, the Amendment 
introduced a third—income taxes—which, to the extent they were 
direct, were now exempt from apportionment.  This innovation meant 
 
 240. Id. at 151. 
 241. Id. at 151–52. 
 242. Id. at 165.  For another case addressing the same corporate tax, see Stratton’s Indep., 
Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 420 (1913), where the Court held that a mining 
corporation was engaged in a business, notwithstanding that it was arguably 
converting capital assets from one form to another, similarly to a manufacturing 
company.  The corporate tax was held to be not an income tax but a levy on the 
corporation’s business activity, the same distinction made two years earlier in Flint v. 
Stone Tracey Co.  Id. at 415.  The line of reasoning in these cases has been criticized 
as fundamentally unworkable.  See, e.g., Riddle, supra note 63, at 572–73 (arguing 
that the distinction between income taxes and excise taxes on business measured by 
income is tenuous).  The Supreme Court was confronted with taxes that had always 
been considered indirect, but applying Pollock to them would lead to a contrary result.  
The Court’s desire to reconcile two irreconcilable views led to the incoherent result 
that an income tax is not an income tax if called an excise. 
 243. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard 
to any census or enumeration.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 244. See Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax 
Clauses), 21 CONST. COMMENT. 355, 357 (2004) (“The process of interpreting the 
Amendment is inevitably also the process of interpreting the Clauses.  You can’t hope 
to understand the Amendment without understanding what it was a reaction to.”). 
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that no analysis of the direct-indirect tax distinction could be 
complete without also examining what is “income.” 
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company – 1916  
Holding: income taxes are indirect and subject to 
uniformity.245  The Sixteenth Amendment overturned 
Pollock, which had held that that a direct tax on income was 
in effect a direct tax on the property generating that income, 
looking past the income to its source.246  The Amendment 
prohibited such a source inquiry, thereby exempting from 
apportionment income taxes, which on their own had always 
been indirect.247  The progressive nature of an income tax 
does not violate the Due Process Clause, although a 
confiscatory tax might do so.248 
Brushaber was the first Supreme Court case to analyze direct taxes 
after the Sixteenth Amendment’s ratification, challenging various 
income tax provisions of a law passed shortly after the Amendment’s 
ratification.  Now-Chief Justice White, who had dissented from the 
Pollock decision, delivered the Court’s opinion.  Examining the 
history of income taxation in the United States, he determined that 
the income taxes levied, although occasionally including income 
from real and personal property, were not treated as “taxes directly on 
property because of its ownership.”249  Chief Justice White then 
interpreted Pollock in a novel way, finding that it had never held that 
income taxes were direct taxes on property.250  Instead, the case 
“recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an 
excise . . . unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would 
amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as to 
apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent.”251  In other 
words, income taxes of any sort are, and have always been, excises 
(and thus indirect), but because of their similarity to direct taxes 
when levied on income from property, the Pollock Court had held 
 
 245. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1916). 
 246. Id. at 9–11. 
 247. Id. at 10–11. 
 248. Id. at 24. 
 249. Id. at 14–15. 
 250. Id. at 15–16. 
 251. Id. at 16–17.  In Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., the Court affirmed this holding, that an 
income tax ought to be tested by what it is rather than by its origin, finding that a tax 
on a mining company’s income was an excise levied on the results of its business.  
240 U.S. 103, 114 (1916). 
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them to be subject to apportionment to protect the constitutional 
structure of taxation.252 
Under this new interpretation, the Sixteenth Amendment did not 
convey any new power of taxation, since Congress had always had 
the power to tax incomes; rather, it served “to relieve all income 
taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the 
source whence the income was derived.”253  The Amendment was 
intended to overturn the principle upon which Pollock was decided, 
of holding an income tax direct based on “the burden which resulted 
on the property from which the income was derived,” rather than “a 
consideration of the burden placed on the taxed income upon which it 
directly operated.”254  It thus prevented an analysis of the sources 
from which income was derived “in order to cause a direct tax on the 
income to be a direct tax on the source itself, and thereby to take an 
income tax out of the class of excises, duties and imposts, and place it 
in the class of direct taxes.”255  This idiosyncratic interpretation likely 
arose from the concern that if income taxes were direct, then not only 
would they be exempt from the uniformity requirement, but they 
would also be exempt from apportionment under the express terms of 
the Sixteenth Amendment.256  Classifying income taxes as indirect 
(though arguably contradicting Pollock) did the least violence to the 
constitutional structure of taxation by ensuring that all existing taxes 
were subject to either apportionment or uniformity.257 
Chief Justice White concluded the decision with several further 
points.  First, the Uniformity Clause requires only geographical 
uniformity.258  Second, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is 
not a limitation on the taxation powers per se,259 except to the 
theoretical extent that a tax in name might violate due process if it 
amounts to “confiscation of property” (i.e., a taking) or leads to such 
gross and obvious inequality as to amount to a taking.260  Third, the 
 
 252. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 16–17. 
 253. Id. at 18. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 19.  Although the Brushaber analysis can readily be criticized for 
misinterpreting the Pollock decision, it did finally resolve the intractable conflict 
between income taxes eo nomine and excise taxes measured as a percentage of 
income.  See supra note 242. 
 256. Id. at 17. 
 257. Id. at 18–19. 
 258. Id. at 24. 
 259. See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment does not hinder Congress’s constitutional taxing power). 
 260. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24–25. 
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progressive features of the tax on their own do not amount to an 
“arbitrary abuse of power” violating due process.261 
Eisner v. Macomber – 1920  
Holding: taxation of income under the Sixteenth 
Amendment requires realization of some gain.262  A tax on 
stock dividends paid in the stock of the company issuing 
them is not a tax on income but on property and is subject to 
apportionment.263 
The seminal case of Macomber considered whether, under the 
Sixteenth Amendment, Congress had the power to tax as income a 
stock dividend made to a shareholder against profits accumulated by 
a corporation after the Amendment’s ratification.264  Justice Pitney, 
writing for the Court, relied primarily on several then-recent cases 
dealing with the statutory interpretation of income.  He first cited 
Towne v. Eisner265 for the proposition that a stock dividend neither 
reduces the corporation’s property nor increases that of the 
shareholder, reasoning that the statute in question could not be 
construed more narrowly than the Sixteenth Amendment.266  Citing 
two additional cases from the same term,267 Justice Pitney observed 
 
 261. Id. at 25.  It has been remarked that the Court’s decision to not apply substantive due 
process doctrine to taxation statutes, even while it was being applied to numerous 
regulatory acts, was significant.  See Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the 
Taxing Power of the Federal Government, 41 TAX LAW. 3, 12 (1987) (“[T]he courts 
sensed that the federal income tax—even in an earlier day—was so full of debatable 
distinctions that any attempt to police the Code in the name of substantive due process 
would lead them from one provision to another in a never-ending process of judicial 
review.”). 
 262. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207–08 (1920). 
 263. Id. at 212–13. 
 264. Although this case was limited to its facts—a stock dividend paid in common stock to 
common stockholders—first the Treasury Department and then Congress in the 
Revenue Act of 1921 exempted all stock dividends from tax.  See Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 241–42 (1937) (dealing with statutory interpretation issues 
arising from the 1921 Act); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446–47 (1936) 
(holding that a distribution of a stock dividend in common stock to preferred 
stockholders was taxable at distribution).  The Court has been urged repeatedly to 
overrule Macomber but so far has declined to do so.  See, e.g., Helvering v. Griffiths, 
318 U.S. 371, 403–04 (1943) (holding that Congress did not intend to tax the dividend 
in question and therefore not reaching a Macomber analysis). 
 265. 245 U.S. 418 (1918). 
 266. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 203. 
 267. Id. at 202 (citing Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918) and Peabody v. Eisner, 247 
U.S. 347 (1918), both also dealing with questions of statutory interpretation). 
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that, on the other hand, extraordinary cash dividends and dividends 
paid in stock of another company were taxable as income.268  Citing 
yet another case of statutory interpretation,269 he found useful the 
definition of income as “gain derived from capital, . . . labor, or . . . 
both combined.”270  Pointing out that the text of the Sixteenth 
Amendment provides for taxes on “incomes, from whatever source 
derived,” and that “income” should be understood in its plain English 
definition, he concluded that income can be defined as “a gain, a 
profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the 
property, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, 
and coming in, being ‘derived’—that is, received or drawn by the 
recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal.”271  
A true stock dividend indicates that a company’s accumulated profits 
had been capitalized; thus, although a shareholder is indeed richer 
due to an increase in capital, there is no realization or receipt of any 
income in the transaction.272  Congress has the power to tax 
 
 268. Id. at 204. 
 269. Id. at 207.  Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918). 
 270. Id. at 185 (citations omitted). 
 271. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207.  This line of reasoning—that income is gain from capital 
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part of the loan); Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 633 (1925) (concluding a 
railroad subsidy payment by a foreign government was held to be a reimbursement for 
capital expenditures, not profit or gain, and thus not income under the Sixteenth 
Amendment). 
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which capitalization is deemed to have occurred.  In United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 
156, 169–70 (1921), the Court held that a stock dividend in the form of a successor 
corporation’s stock is income, unless the old and new companies are substantially 
identical (formation of a new company in another state and a stock split were too 
much).  The companion case to Phellis, Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176, 
183–84 (1921), where two oil companies spun off their pipeline business and 
distributed stock in the new corporations to their shareholders, concluded that the 
stock so distributed was income.  A later case, Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 138 
(1923), used the same reasoning to come to a similar conclusion, holding that the 
stock of new corporations distributed upon the liquidation of an old corporation was a 
taxable gain.  See Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536, 541–42 (1925), for another 
case of a reorganization where the new stock was held to be substantially different 
from the old.  However, see Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924), for a case 
where a reorganization was deemed technical enough to avoid taxation on stock 
distributed.  Offering stock subscription rights to existing shareholders was also 
similar enough to a stock dividend to not be taxable until those rights were sold.  
Miles v. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. of Balt., 259 U.S. 247, 252 (1922). 
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shareholders on their property interests in corporate stock, even if 
valued in reference to the company’s accumulated and undivided 
profits, but this would be taxation of property because of ownership 
and subject to apportionment.273 
New York Trust Company v. Eisner – 1921  
Holding: an estate tax is indirect.274 
This case saw a challenge to a federal estate tax on the grounds that 
it was a direct tax on a decedent’s property.275  Justice Holmes, 
writing for the Court, relied on Knowlton to dispose of the objection.  
Although Knowlton dealt with an inheritance tax, and the present 
case—with an estate tax,276 Holmes thought the distinction 
immaterial.  Death duties, broadly understood, “treated the ‘power to 
transmit or the transmission or receipt of property by death’ as all 
standing on the same footing.”277  Per Knowlton, historical 
understanding and practice treated as indirect both the avoidable 
inheritance tax and the inevitable estate tax.278  The inevitability of 
the estate tax is insufficient to render it direct in the face of contrary 
historical precedent, where on “this point a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.”279 
 
 273. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 217. 
 274. N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1921). 
 275. Id. at 349 (“It is argued . . . here the [estate] tax is inevitable and therefore direct.”). 
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inheritance tax (also called a succession or legacy tax).  Estate taxes are levied on, and 
with reference to, a decedent’s entire net estate.  Estate Tax, BLACK’S LAW 
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 277. See N.Y. Tr. Co., 256 U.S. at 348–49 (quoting Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 57 
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 278. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47.  An estate tax is also indirect when applied to property held 
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United States, 281 U.S. 497, 504 (1930); see also United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 
363, 370 (1939) (applying the same reasoning and coming to the same result for 
property held in a joint tenancy). 
 279. N.Y. Tr. Co., 256 U.S. at 349. 
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Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. – 1922  
Holding: a tax on net business profits is an excise.280  A 
heavy burden alone does not make a tax a penalty, but a 
putative tax may have such penalizing features as to become 
a penalty.281  The act must be “reasonably adapted to the 
collection of the tax” and not aimed to achieve an otherwise 
unconstitutional purpose.282 
This case dealt with the constitutional validity of a ten percent tax 
on the net profits of any business that employed children younger 
than fourteen years of age.283  Chief Justice Taft, writing for the 
Court, found that the law in question was a regulation of child labor 
and not a tax, citing: (1) the law’s stated intent; (2) that it provided a 
detailed and specified course of business conduct; (3) that the penalty 
was not proportioned to the extent or frequency of violations; and (4) 
that its imposition required a knowing violation.284  If the law were a 
tax, it would be “clearly an excise[,]” and the Court would not “infer 
solely from its heavy burden that the act intends a prohibition instead 
of a tax.”285  However, an ostensible tax might have such penalizing 
features that “it loses its character as such and becomes a mere 
penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.”286  A 
motive other than taxation is insufficient to invalidate a tax, although 
“the taxing act must be naturally and reasonably adapted to the 
collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of some other 
purpose plainly within state power.”287 
Bromley v. McCaughn – 1929  
Holding: a gift tax is an excise.288  Taxes levied based on 
general ownership are direct, whereas taxes levied based on 
 
 280. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 35–36, 42–43 
(1922). 
 281. Id. at 36–37. 
 282. Id. at 43; see also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1922) (striking down a per-
bushel tax on grain futures contracts settled on certain boards of trade on the grounds 
that the tax’s purpose was to compel the boards to comply with regulations not related 
to the tax’s collection). 
 283. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 20. 
 284. Id. at 36–37, 41. 
 285. Id. at 36. 
 286. Id. at 38. 
 287. Id. at 43. 
 288. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138 (1929). 
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a particular use of property or exercise of power incidental 
to ownership are excises.289  A graduated rate schedule is 
constitutional.290 
In Bromley, Justice Stone, writing for the Court, addressed, first, 
whether a gift tax was direct and, second, whether its graduated rate 
schedule violated the Uniformity Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.291  On the first issue, noting the opacity of 
“direct taxes[,]” he articulated a succinct distinguishing rule: while 
taxes levied upon persons “because of their general ownership of 
property may be taken to be direct . . . a tax imposed upon a 
particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over 
property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be 
apportioned.”292  With the gift tax, as with other levies like legacy 
taxes, but one of the many rights of property was being taxed.293  It 
was thus not a tax falling on an owner merely because of his passive 
ownership regardless of use or disposition of property.  Justice Stone 
did not find convincing the objection that so many of the rights of 
property could be taxed as to have a net effect of taxing ownership 
itself.294  On the second issue, he observed that uniformity “is 
geographic not intrinsic,” and that graduated taxes have long been 
upheld as constitutional and are not on their own “so arbitrary and 
unreasonable” as to violate the dictates of due process.295 
Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co. – 1934  
Holding: Congress may limit deductions from gross income 
to arrive at the net it chooses to tax.296 
 In this case at issue was a revenue provision allowing life insurance 
companies to deduct expenses for real estate owned and occupied 
wholly or partially by the company, provided that rental value of at 
least four percent of the real property’s book value, in addition to 
 
 289. Id. at 136. 
 290. Id. at 138–39. 
 291. Id. at 135. 
 292. Id. at 136. 
 293. Id. at 137. 
 294. See id. at 137–38 (opining that the power to give is a power incidental to ownership, 
and a tax levied upon such a limited use is distinguishable from a direct tax on the 
property itself). 
 295. Id. at 138–39. 
 296. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). 
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rental income from other tenants, was included in annual income.297  
Justice Butler, writing for the Court, addressed whether this 
amounted to a tax on the rental value of space occupied by such a 
company.298  He conceded that a tax “on the part of a building 
occupied by the owner” would be a direct tax, as “[t]he rental value 
[of such property] does not constitute income within the meaning of 
the Sixteenth Amendment.”299  However, the statutory formula 
operated in lieu of an apportionment of expenses, resulting in “a 
diminution or apportionment of expenses to be deducted from gross 
income”—effectively, a condition or limit on deductions from gross 
income—a power that Congress may freely exercise “to arrive at the 
net that it chooses to tax.”300  Accordingly, the tax was not on real 
property owned and occupied by the owner and thus was indirect.301 
United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. – 1936  
Holding: income is treated as income when its amount 
becomes certain and definite.302 
Here, a company on the accrual accounting method had brought a 
patent infringement suit against another company for actions 
occurring both before and after the effective date of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, eventually confining its claim to profits and settling the 
suit in 1925.303  Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, considered 
whether the company owed tax only on the profits attributable to the 
period after the Amendment was ratified.304  He observed that the 
amount of liability was contested until the settlement in 1925, and 
that the claim was too contingent and indefinite to be considered 
accrued income at the time when the Sixteenth Amendment and the 
first revenue law adopted under it became effective in 1913.305  An 
“expectancy of income, or income, . . . in the process of becoming” is 
insufficient to be income proper; rather, it must be certain and 
definite to be considered income.306  Income under the Sixteenth 
 
 297. Id. at 376–77. 
 298. Id. at 378. 
 299. Id. at 378–79. 
 300. Id. at 381. 
 301. See id.  
 302. United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936). 
 303. Id. at 90–91. 
 304. Id. at 90, 94. 
 305. Id. at 93–94. 
 306. Id. at 99. 
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Amendment “is the fruit that is born of capital, not the potency of 
fruition.”307  Further, the acceptance of a settlement lower than the 
value of the claim at a certain point in time involves a loss of neither 
income nor capital.308 
 Sonzinsky v. United States – 1937  
Holding: a court will not speculate on congressional motives 
behind a tax or its restrictive effects, so long as it produces 
some revenue, is “not attended by offensive regulation, and . 
. .  operates as a tax.”309 
In Sonzinsky, the petitioner challenged an annual license tax on 
firearms dealers on the grounds that it was a penalty imposed to 
suppress traffic in certain firearms.310  Justice Stone, writing for the 
Court, observed that the statute did not contain express regulatory 
provisions, nor was the subject of the tax treated as criminal.311  All 
taxes have regulatory components to establish “economic 
impediment[s]” on the things taxed, and a regulatory effect is 
insufficient to invalidate a tax.312  Indeed, “it has long been 
established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be 
an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax 
is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.”313  So 
long as a tax operates as a tax, produces some revenue, and is not 
accompanied by “an offensive regulation,” the courts will not 
speculate on the congressional motives in imposing the tax—or its 
regulatory effects.314 
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis – 1937  
Holding: a tax on certain employers, measured by wages 
paid, is a valid excise.315  Direct taxes and duties, imposts, 
and excises (i.e. indirect taxes) include every form of 
possible taxation.316  The actual classification of an indirect 
 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 100. 
 309. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937). 
 310. Id. at 512. 
 311. Id. at 511, 513. 
 312. Id. at 513. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 514. 
 315. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578–83 (1937). 
 316. Id. at 581. 
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tax as an excise, impost, or duty is unimportant, as the result 
is the same.317 
In this case, a company challenged a tax measured as a percentage 
of total wages payable by employers with eight or more employees.318  
Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, determined that the statute is 
“an excise upon the relation of employment.”319  He disagreed with 
the claim that because “employment is a right, not a privilege,” it is 
exempt from excises, finding that history and conceptual analyses 
pointed to excises applying to both.320  Congress has broad discretion 
to choose the subject matter of taxation, circumscribed somewhat by 
different restrictions on the respective classes of taxes.321  “Together, 
these classes include every form of tax appropriate to sovereignty.  
Whether the tax is to be classified as an ‘excise’ is in truth not of 
critical importance.  If not that, it is an ‘impost,’ or a ‘duty.’  A 
capitation or other ‘direct’ tax it certainly is not.”322  Further, the tax 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding the various 
exemptions from the excise.323  Even states, which are subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (to which the 
federal government is not, for the Fifth Amendment lacks such a 
clause), “are not confined to a formula of rigid uniformity in framing 
measures of taxation.”324 
Helvering v. Bruun – 1940  
Holding: severance of an improvement begetting gain from 
the original capital is unnecessary for realization to occur.325 
 
 317. Id. at 581–82. 
 318. Id. at 573–74.  Similar issues were raised in the companion case of Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937), where the Supreme Court, on the same grounds as in 
Steward Machine Co., upheld a Social Security excise upon employers and a special 
income tax on employees to be deducted from their wages and paid by the 
employers—the analogue to modern withholding under the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (FICA).  See generally I.R.C. §§ 3101–3128 (2012) (requiring that 
employers withhold a set percentage of their employees’ wages, to be matched by 
employers, as part of the Social Security Trust Fund). 
 319. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 578. 
 320. Id. at 578–79. 
 321. Id. at 581–82. 
 322. Id. (citations omitted). 
 323. Id. at 583. 
 324. Id. at 584. 
 325. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940). 
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In Bruun, a tenant demolished a building on leased land and 
constructed a new one with a higher fair market value.326  Upon the 
lease’s termination, the government determined that the owner 
realized a net gain on the transaction.327  Justice Roberts, writing for 
the Court, disagreed with the owner’s contention that under the 
Sixteenth Amendment added value can be realized only on the 
owner’s disposition of the asset.328  Although “economic gain is not 
always taxable as income, it is settled that the realization of gain need 
not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset.”329  Severance of “the 
improvement begetting the gain from the original capital” was 
unnecessary for recognition of taxable gain.330  “Gain may occur as a 
result of exchange of property, payment of the taxpayer’s 
indebtedness, relief from a liability, or other profit realized from the 
completion of a transaction.”331  Nevertheless, realization of gain in 
some form is still a necessary condition for a taxable event to 
occur.332 
 
 326. Id. at 464–65. 
 327. Id. at 465. 
 328. Id. at 467. 
 329. Id. at 469. 
 330. Id.  
 331. Id.  Justice Roberts cited a series of statutory interpretation cases dealing with the 
realization of gain under provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.  Id. at 469 n.9.  See 
United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566–67 (1938) (holding that a corporation 
realized gain on a merger involving both an exchange of stock or securities); 
Helvering v. Am. Chicle Co., 291 U.S. 426, 430 (1934) (holding that a company 
realized income from debt forgiveness, when it assumed bonds which it later 
redeemed at less than face value); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 
(1931) (holding that a company realized income from debt forgiveness, when it 
redeemed its own bonds at less than face value); Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279 
U.S. 716, 731 (1929) (holding that an employer’s payment of income taxes assessable 
against an employee was additional taxable income to that employee); Marr v. United 
States, 268 U.S. 536, 540 (1925) (holding that an exchange of securities of a New 
Jersey corporation for different securities of a Delaware corporation was income to 
the stockholder); Cullinan v. Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 137–38  (1923) (holding that the 
stock of new corporations distributed upon the liquidation of an old corporation was a 
taxable gain).  A case that followed Bruun by only ten days was Helvering v. Horst, 
311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940), in which the Court held that the gift of interest coupons 
detached from bonds and in the same year paid at maturity was akin to an assignment 
of income and taxable to the bondholder.  
 332. Accordingly, half a century later, in Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner, the 
Court held that a financial institution had realized a tax loss on exchanging its 
interests in a loan portfolio for another lender’s interests in a different portfolio 
because the properties were different materially, and the owners enjoyed “legal 
entitlements . . . different in kind or extent.”  499 U.S. 554, 565 (1991).  Justice 
Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, elaborated on the realization 
concept: 
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Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins – 1940  
Holding: taxation may be used as a sanction to enforce 
regulatory provisions of laws.333 
Here, at issue was an extraordinary 19.5% tax on sales of 
bituminous coal by producers who refused to participate in a coal 
regulatory scheme.334  Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, 
observed that while the tax was “not designed merely for revenue 
purposes” and was “a sanction to enforce the regulatory provisions of 
the Act,” this alone was insufficient to invalidate it, as the taxation 
power “may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of another 
power which is granted it.”335  Furthermore, Douglas found that the 
application of the tax to some types of coal (i.e., that produced by 
non-compliant companies) but not to others was not discriminatory 
under the Fifth Amendment: “the Fifth Amendment, unlike the 
 
 It long has been established that gain or loss in the value of 
property is taken into account for income tax purposes only if and 
when the gain or loss is “realized,” that is, when it is tied to a 
realization event, such as the sale, exchange, or other disposition 
of the property.  Mere variation in value—the routine ups and 
downs of the marketplace—do not in themselves have income tax 
consequences.  This is fundamental in income tax laws. 
 Id. at 569–70. 
 Although the realization requirement has been circumscribed in some respects, see 
Kornhauser, supra note 13, at 20 (“Thus, while Eisner v. Macomber nominally stands 
as a constitutional barrier to taxing unrealized appreciation, the reality is that the 
Court, through its own action and its acquiescence in congressional action, has 
relegated the realization requirement to the lower realm of administrative 
convenience.”), with some commentators suggesting that it has been abandoned, see 
Testimony of David Rosenbloom at the Finance Hearing on Expatriate Taxation 
Before the Senate Committee on Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and Internal 
Revenue Service Oversight, 104th Cong. 51 (1995) (statement of H. David 
Rosenbloom), the Court has steadfastly refused to overrule Macomber’s realization 
holding, evidenced as recently as Chief Justice Roberts’s citing the case in his opinion 
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 
(2012). 
 For good defenses of realization, see Erik M. Jensen, The Constitutionality of a Mark-
to-Market Taxing System, 143 TAX NOTES 1299 (2014); Mark E. Berg, Bar the Exit 
(Tax)! Section 877A, the Constitutional Prohibition Against Unapportioned Direct 
Taxes and the Realization Requirement, 65 TAX LAW. 181, 192–205 (2012); Henry 
Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, 
and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 58 (1993). 
 333. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940). 
 334. Id. at 389, 391–92. 
 335. Id. at 393. 
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Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause,” and in any case, the tax 
was a constitutionally permissible sanction for non-compliance with 
the statutory regulatory scheme.336 
Fernandez v. Wiener – 1945  
Holding: an estate tax on the entire community property is 
an excise.337  A tax on real estate or chattels is direct.338  On 
the other hand, a tax on a “particular use or enjoyment of 
property or the shifting from one to another of any power or 
privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of 
property” is indirect.339 
Fernandez saw another challenge to the federal estate tax, this time 
as applied to the community property estate of a husband and wife 
upon one spouse’s death.340  Chief Justice Stone, writing for the 
Court, disagreed with the claim that a spouse’s death in a community 
property state results in a transfer of only the half share held by the 
decedent and that a tax upon the remainder is a direct tax subject to 
apportionment.341  He noted that the taxing power “extends to the 
creation, exercise, acquisition, or relinquishment of any power or 
legal privilege which is incident to the ownership of property, and 
when any of these is occasioned by death, it may as readily be the 
subject of the federal tax as the transfer of the property at death.”342  
 
 336. Id. at 400–01.  The Fifth Amendment’s interpretation would change with later 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to include equal protection components.  This shift, 
however, did not see any change in the Court’s position on discriminatory taxation.  
That position was summarized by Justice Rehnquist in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Washington, where, in the context of a challenge under the First and 
Fifth Amendments by a non-profit organization to the § 501(c)(3) restrictions on 
lobbying, he observed that Congress has “especially broad latitude in creating 
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.” 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).  Although 
“[b]oth tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy,” id. at 544, such 
tax preferences are subject to heightened scrutiny only when “they interfere with the 
exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of speech, or employ a suspect 
classification, such as race.” Id. at 547.  As for the First Amendment, discretionary 
subsidies through the Tax Code are generally subject to standard rational basis review, 
so long as the “governmental provision of subsidies is not ‘aimed at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas.’”  Id. at 550 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 
(1959)). 
 337. Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945). 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 343–44. 
 341. Id. at 346–47. 
 342. Id. at 352. 
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The Court had long held that “Congress may tax real estate or 
chattels if the tax is apportioned, and without apportionment it may 
tax an excise upon a particular use or enjoyment of property or the 
shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to 
the ownership or enjoyment of property.”343  As in previous cases 
dealing with estate taxes imposed on property held in a tenancy by 
the entirety and joint tenancy, the husband’s death changed the rights 
and powers of the wife to the community property, which was 
sufficient to justify imposing an excise upon the entire value of it.344  
The tax did not violate constitutional due process guarantees, as it 
was not arbitrary or capricious, nor did it violate uniformity, for it 
applied to the entire United States geographically, notwithstanding 
that some states had marital community property laws and others did 
not.345 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius – 2012  
Holding: Congress may tax inactivity, as taxing inactivity is 
economically identical to giving a tax incentive for 
activity.346  Direct taxes include capitations, taxes on real 
and personal property, and income from property; the 
Sixteenth Amendment overturned the result as to the 
latter.347  A tax may be so punitive as to cease being a tax; 
however, the precise point at which this can occur is 
undecided.348 
 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 354–55. 
 345. Id. at 358–60; see supra notes 207–13 (discussing the uniformity requirement as 
applied to variations in state law). 
 346. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012). 
 347. Id. at 2598. 
 348. Id. at 2600.  The lead up to and aftermath of this case led to a flurry of activity among 
commentators, who with great relish overturned nearly every rock they could find in 
attempts to validate or condemn the Affordable Care Act.  See, e.g., Brian Galle, The 
Taxing Power, The Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of Constitutional 
Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407, 409–12 (2011) (explaining that the 
individual responsibility requirement portion of the Affordable Care Act is a tax rather 
than a penalty); Mark A. Hall, A Healthcare Case for the Ages, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCI. L. 1, 12 (2012) (explaining that the Affordable Care Act is a tax for constitutional 
purposes); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 
92–93 (2012) (explaining that even though it was labeled as a penalty in the Act, it 
was “paid as part of most Americans’ most basic tax action” and even if it were not a 
tax, “Congress should be able to require individuals to purchase health insurance or 
pay a penalty . . . .”). 
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This case addressed several substantive tax questions related to a 
“shared responsibility payment” on individuals without health 
insurance.349  The exaction, paid by taxpayers when they filed their 
income tax returns, applied only to individuals whose income 
exceeded the threshold for filing returns and was computed with 
reference to a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.350  Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the Court, held that the payment was a tax, 
notwithstanding that it was called a “penalty” in the statute.351  The 
label was not dispositive on the constitutional question—a 
substantive analysis was necessary.  Chief Justice Roberts outlined 
four considerations to analyze whether a levy is a tax: (1) whether it 
produces “some revenue for the government”;352 (2) whether it avoids 
“impos[ing] an exceedingly heavy burden”;353 (3) whether it lacks the 
elements of a punitive statute, such as a scienter requirement; and (4) 
whether it is enforced by the revenue service alone.354  Finding that 
the exaction in question answered each consideration affirmatively, 
he concluded that it reasonably may be deemed a tax.355  Moreover, it 
was not a punishment for an unlawful act or omission, and there were 
no “negative legal consequences to not buying health insurance, 
beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.”356 
Roberts, having found the payment to be a tax, then considered 
whether it was a direct tax requiring apportionment.  To that effect, 
he observed that by the early 20th century, direct taxes were 
understood to include capitations, taxes on property both real and 
personal, and income from property.357  After 1913, however, “[t]hat 
result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we 
 
 349. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–99 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) 
(2012)). 
 350. Id. at 2594 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(2)). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 n.4 (1953)). 
 353. Id. at 2595 (citing Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922)) (explaining that 
the ostensible “tax,” in that case was determined to be a penalty because it was ten 
percent of a company’s net income, without regard to the magnitude of the infraction). 
 354. Id.  For a variation on this idea, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power 
to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 
(2012), which develops an “effects theory” of the distinction between taxes and 
penalties that follows the Chief Justice’s reasoning in this case.  Practically speaking, 
the Court is unlikely to hold an exaction an unconstitutional penalty, for the bar has 
been set so high, although the theoretical possibility remains.  E.g., Stewart Jay, On 
Slippery Constitutional Slopes and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 
1175–87 (2012). 
 355. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 356. Id. at 2597. 
 357. Id. at 2598. 
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continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct 
taxes.”358  The tax at issue was not one on the ownership of land or 
personal property.359  It also was not a capitation, for capitations are 
taxes paid by every person without regard to any particular 
circumstance; here, the payment was triggered by two specific 
circumstances—earning income above a certain threshold and not 
obtaining health insurance.360  Further, “the Constitution does not 
guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through inactivity,” as 
the document recognizes, for example, capitations—taxes “that 
everyone must pay simply for existing”—as a form of acceptable 
tax.361  In any case, taxing an individual for not doing something has 
 
 358. Id. (citing Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1920)).  It is unclear what 
Chief Justice Roberts meant here by stating that “[t]hat result was overturned by the 
Sixteenth Amendment.”  Did he refer to the result that a tax on income, regardless of 
whether it may be considered direct, is no longer subject to apportionment?  Or that 
the Sixteenth Amendment took income out of the definition of a direct tax entirely?  
Some Supreme Court precedent, and Eisner v. Macomber in particular (which upheld 
Pollock generally, albeit without reference to this particular question), might suggest 
the former.  But see Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17–19 (1916) (holding 
that the Sixteenth Amendment, in overturning certain holdings in Pollock, prohibited 
inquiries to the source of income, thereby exempting from apportionment income 
taxes which are—on account of the lack of source inquiry—in fact indirect).  Chief 
Justice Roberts’s language here is ambiguous.  If he thought the Sixteenth 
Amendment to have reclassified income taxes as indirect, then why not say as much 
or at least cite to Brushaber?  That the Chief Justice did not is highly telling.   
 This question is more than theoretical.  If the Sixteenth Amendment simply removed 
the apportionment requirement for direct income taxes, then they are constrained 
neither by apportionment nor uniformity.  If the Amendment somehow converted 
income taxes from direct to indirect, then they are subject to uniformity.  Granted, no 
income taxes to date have violated geographical uniformity, and the prospect of such a 
tax being enacted seems remote, not to say that a non-geographically uniform income 
tax would probably violate constitutional due process guarantees. 
 359. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 360. Chief Justice Roberts did not attempt to definitively classify the tax, which did not go 
unnoticed among commentators.  See Matthew A. Melone, The Pundits Doth Protest 
Too Much: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius and the Future of 
the Taxing Power, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1189, 1240 (2012) (“It is not clear whether 
the Court believed that the individual mandate is not a direct tax subject to 
apportionment because it is an income tax or because it is an excise tax irrespective of 
the method in which it is calculated.”). 
 361. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.  This analogy is troublesome, as 
capitations—taxes on “simply . . . existing”—are direct, yet Chief Justice Roberts 
contended that the payment was indirect.  Professor Kleinbard anticipated and 
sidestepped this problem by arguing that the penalty is a tax on the provision of health 
care self-insurance and not a tax on inactivity at all.  Edward D. Kleinbard, 
Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NOTES 755, 756 (2010).  The penalty has also been 
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the same economic effect as giving that individual a tax incentive to 
do that thing.  Although taxes may theoretically be extended in such a 
manner as to become excessively punitive, and “Congress’s ability to 
use its taxing power to influence conduct is not without limits,” the 
present case did not require the Court to determine the “precise 
point” where the line would be drawn.362 
C. Cases Interpreting the Uniformity Clause 
While direct taxes are limited by the apportionment requirement, 
indirect taxes are constrained by uniformity.363  The doctrine here is 
simpler than that of direct taxes, and the cases examined will be few 
in number.  After Knowlton v. Moore, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on this topic has more or less repeated that case’s 
holding: the Uniformity Clause requires only geographical 
uniformity. 
United States v. Singer – 1872  
Holding: the Uniformity Clause requires uniformity in a 
tax’s operation—that the tax must apply equally wherever 
the taxable object may be.364 
In Singer, at issue was a tax on distillers assessed at a minimum of 
eighty percent of the distillery’s producing capacity, regardless of its 
actual operating capacity.365  Justice Field, writing for the Court, 
concluded that the tax was an excise and thus subject to uniformity 
throughout the United States.366  The tax was “uniform in its 
operation; that is, it is assessed equally upon all manufacturers of 
spirits wherever they are.  The law does not establish one rule for one 
distiller and a different rule for another, but the same rule for all 
alike.”367 
 
 
called a tax on a particular use of wealth (for purposes other than purchasing health 
insurance) or a tax on a particular form of insurance (shifting the cost from one’s self 
to society).  Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health 
Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27, 31–32 (2010). 
 362. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599–600. 
 363. “[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 364. United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111, 121 (1872). 
 365. Id. at 118. 
 366. Id. at 121. 
 367. Id. 
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Edye v. Robertson – 1884  
Holding: a tax is uniform when it operates with equal force 
and effect in every place where its subject is found; the 
Uniformity Clause does not contemplate perfect equality.368 
In the Head Money Cases, a ship owner challenged a duty on non-
U.S. citizen passengers arriving by vessel at any American port; the 
revenue from which went to a fund to defray the expense of 
regulating immigration.369  Justice Miller, writing for the Court, 
observed that the uniformity required by the Constitution was only 
geographical.370  “[A] tax is uniform when it operates with the same 
force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”371  
The challenged tax was an excise duty operating “precisely alike in 
every port of the United States where [foreign] passengers can be 
landed.”372  It was not fatal that the tax only applied to marine ports 
and not inland borders.  “Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of 
taxation, in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it, is a 
baseless dream.”373  Chief Justice Miller concluded that the 
imposition in question, though “as far as it can be called a tax, [it] is 
an excise duty,”374 was in fact imposed not under the taxation power 
but as a regulation of commerce and immigration.375  Nonetheless, he 
likely would have upheld it under the taxing power if none other were 
available.376 
Knowlton v. Moore – 1900  
Holding: the Uniformity Clause requires only geographical 
uniformity.377 
Knowlton, discussed above in the context of classifying direct 
taxes, is also relevant in its analysis of the Uniformity Clause.378  The 
 
 368. Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884). 
 369. Id. at 586. 
 370. Id. at 594. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. at 595 (citing Taylor v. Secor (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U.S. 575, 612 (1876) 
(examining the courts’ equity jurisdiction to restrain the collection of state taxes)). 
 374. Id. at 594. 
 375. Id. at 595. 
 376. See id. 
 377. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 105–06 (1900).   
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issue in this case was whether duties, imposts, and excises need be 
imposed on an intrinsically equal and uniform basis in their operation 
on individuals (i.e., whether a progressive tax was prohibited), or 
whether they were constrained solely by geographical uniformity.379 
Justice White, writing for the Court, concluded that interpreting the 
Uniformity Clause to require equal treatment of all individuals would 
deprive the words “throughout the United States” of meaning.380  The 
provision’s intent was to forbid geographical discrimination by the 
national government.381  Indirect taxes were never understood to be 
subject to inherent equality and uniformity, and congressional 
practice in the United States had always adhered to geographical 
uniformity but not to other forms of equal application.382  White 
observed that the reasoning of the Head Money Cases on the 
constitutional prohibition of port preferences also applied to the 
Uniformity Clause, as both provisions were treated in their operation 
as identical by the Constitutional Convention.383  White also rejected 
the argument that a progressive tax was fundamentally unjust and 
should be held void.384  The question of progressivity was a 
legislative, not judicial, one, and no constitutional limitation 
supported striking down the law on that basis.385  He declined to 
 
 378. The holdings in this case as to the Uniformity Clause have been reaffirmed exactly by 
numerous subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 
(1916); Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 
220 U.S. 107, 158 (1911). 
 379. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 84–85. 
 380. Id. at 87. 
 381. Id. at 89.  Differences in state laws affecting federal tax liability do not cause a federal 
tax to violate the uniformity requirement.  See Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 602 
(1931) (“The extent and incidence of federal taxes not infrequently are affected by 
differences in state laws; but such variations do not infringe the constitutional 
prohibitions against delegation of the taxing power or the requirement of geographical 
uniformity.”); see also Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 102 (1942) (“Nor does the 
fact that the ultimate incidence of the federal estate tax is governed by state law 
violate the requirement of geographical uniformity.”); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 
117–18 (1930) (“[D]ifferences of state law, which may bring a person within or 
without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read . . . to spell 
out a lack of uniformity.”). 
 382. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 92.  A broader reading of the Uniformity Clause would have 
made impossible the current system of taxation in the United States.  See Bittker, 
supra note 261, at 10 (“A broad reading of the uniformity clause . . . would not only 
have rendered exemptions and differential tax rates unconstitutional, but it might well 
have invalidated the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income and a host 
of other provisions that make up the warp and woof of the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
 383. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 106. 
 384. Id. at 109. 
 385. Id. at 109–10. 
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consider whether the judicial branch had the power to overturn “an 
arbitrary and confiscatory exaction . . . imposed bearing the guise of a 
progressive or any other form of tax,” as the present case did not fall 
into that category.386 
United States v. Ptasynski – 1983  
Holding: it does not violate uniformity to define the subject 
of a tax in geographical terms where a unique class merits 
special treatment.387 
For over eighty years after Knowlton, the Court did not address any 
novel Uniformity Clause challenges until Ptasynski, where at issue 
was an excise had been levied on crude oil extracted in the United 
States.388  Exempted from the tax were certain classes of oil defined 
in geographical terms, including “exempt Alaskan oil.”389  Justice 
Powell, writing for the Court, observed that “cases have confirmed 
that the Framers did not intend to restrict Congress’ ability to define 
the class of objects to be taxed.390  They intended only that the tax 
apply wherever the classification is found.”391  The Uniformity 
Clause is satisfied where the subject of a tax is defined in non-
geographic terms, but it is not necessarily fatal to a tax’s validity for 
the subject to be defined in geographical terms.392  In the latter 
instance, a court ought to “examine the classification closely to see if 
there is actual geographic discrimination.”393  With “exempt Alaskan 
oil,” Powell concluded that it was a unique class meriting favorable 
treatment due to the “disproportionate costs and difficulties—the 
fragile ecology, the harsh environment, and the remote location— 
associated with extracting oil from this region,” and that there was no 
“indication that Congress sought to benefit Alaska for reasons that 
would offend the purpose of the Clause.”394  Accordingly, the Court 
 
 386. Id. 
 387. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983). 
 388. See id. at 75, 81. 
 389. Id. at 77. 
 390. Id. at 82. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 84. 
 393. Id. at 85.  This broad reading of the Uniformity Clause has caused some to question 
whether the restriction has been read out of the Constitution entirely.  See Nelson 
Lund, Comment, The Uniformity Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193, 1200–05 (1984). 
 394. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85–86. 
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would not disturb congressional judgment on such “an enormously 
complex problem[.]”395 
D. Cases Interpreting the Export Clause 
Although the Export Clause396 seems to speak for itself,397 the 
Supreme Court has nonetheless addressed it on several occasions.  In 
the cases that follow, certain subtleties in the Clause become 
apparent, with the unusual trend being to interpret its restrictions 
expansively. 
Pace v. Burgess – 1875  
Holding: a fixed administrative fee imposed on export-
bound goods without regard to quantity or value is not a tax 
and does not violate the Export Clause.398 
At issue in Pace was a law requiring that stamps be affixed to 
packages of manufactured tobacco intended for exportation, per a law 
imposing an excise tax on all such tobacco except that intended for 
export; the stamp’s cost was fixed and did not vary depending on the 
container’s size or weight.399  Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, 
observed that “[t]he stamp was intended [only] to separate and 
identify the tobacco which the manufacturer desired to export, and 
thereby, instead of taxing it, to relieve it from the taxation to which 
other tobacco was subjected.”400  The stamp was compensation for 
 
 395. Id. at 86. 
 396. “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9, cl. 5. 
 397. Though perhaps not—the Clause has on occasion been pressed into service to argue 
that it should limit non-tax export controls.  See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of 
Export Controls, 76 YALE L.J. 200, 201 (1966) (contending that export quotas on 
certain key goods—iron, steel, aluminum, nickel, and sugar—the justification for 
which was domestic scarcity, violated the Export Clause). 
 398. Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 373 (1875).   
 399. Id.  A similar case to Pace arose again a decade later in Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 
504 (1886).  The Court there observed that although it would be unconstitutional to 
impose a duty “on goods by reason or because of their exportation or intended 
exportation, or whilst they are being exported. . . .  a general tax, laid on all property 
alike, and not levied on goods in course of exportation, nor because of their intended 
exportation, is not within the constitutional prohibition.”  Id. at 507.  For support, the 
Court cited to Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886), where it had upheld, 
notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition on state taxes on imports and exports, a 
general state property tax that included some property ultimately exported.  Turpin, 
117 U.S. at 506. 
 400. Pace, 92 U.S. at 375. 
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administrative expenses, akin to a fee for clearing a vessel or 
certifying a cargo manifest, evidenced by the stamp’s cost being 
fixed at a single price bearing “no proportion whatever to the quantity 
or value of the package on which it was affixed.”401  Since the charge 
imposed was not excessive, and the stamp was not used for the 
purpose of levying a duty or tax (rather, its intent was to secure 
exemption from a tax), it did not run afoul of the constitutional 
prohibition on export taxes.402 
Fairbank v. United States – 1901  
Holding: no tax may be levied which directly burdens 
exportation.403 
In Fairbank, at issue was a fixed stamp duty on bills of lading (i.e., 
shipping manifests) for export-bound goods, with internal bills 
charged one cent and export bills charged ten.404  Justice Brewer, 
writing for the Court, noted that the Constitution requires “that 
exports should be free from any governmental burden.  The language 
is ‘no tax or duty.’”405  Congress, in imposing the duty on bills of 
lading, “as effectually place[d] a burden upon exports as though it 
placed a tax directly upon the articles exported.  It can, for the 
purposes of revenue, receive just as much as though it placed a duty 
directly upon the articles, and it can just as fully restrict . . . free 
exportation.”406  The restriction’s purpose was not solely to prevent 
discrimination among states that would occur if export taxes were 
imposed on certain articles produced in only several states.407  Rather, 
the restriction serves to free all exports from federal burden.  This 
“requires not simply an omission of a tax upon the articles exported, 
but also a freedom from any tax which directly burdens the 
exportation.”408 
Justice Brewer found support in the Court’s prior cases.  Nicol v. 
Ames409 held that a stamp tax imposed upon every instrument 
 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 376. 
 403. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 295, 312 (1901). 
 404. Id. at 283–84. 
 405. Id. at 290. 
 406. Id. at 290–91. 
 407. Id. at 292. 
 408. Id. at 293. 
 409. 173 U.S. 509 (1899). 
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evidencing a sale was effectively a tax upon the property sold.410  
Likewise, Brown v. Maryland411 held that a tax in the form of a 
license required of importers was in fact a tax on imports, “and that 
the mode of imposing it by giving it the form of a tax on the 
occupation of importer merely varied the form without changing the 
substance.”412  Several additional cases supported the proposition that 
Congress cannot evade a restriction on taxation by imposing a tax on 
people or items or actions incident to the subject on which a tax is 
restricted.413  Brewer distinguished Pace, as there the stamp covered 
the administrative costs of exempting tobacco, while in Fairbank “the 
stamp [was] distinctly for the purpose of revenue and not by way of 
compensation for services rendered.”414  Therefore, “a stamp tax on a 
foreign bill of lading is in substance and effect equivalent to a tax on 
the articles included in that bill of lading, and therefore a tax or duty 
on exports, and in conflict with the constitutional prohibition.”415 
Cornell v. Coyne – 1904  
Holding: export-bound articles may be taxed by a generally 
applicable law applying to all property similarly situated.416 
Cornell saw a challenge to a general tax on filled cheese that did 
not exempt product manufactured for export.417  Justice Brewer, 
writing for the Court, observed that “[s]ubjecting filled cheese 
manufactured for the purpose of export to the same tax as all other 
filled cheese is casting no tax or duty on articles exported, but is only 
a tax or duty on the manufacturing of articles in order to prepare them 
for export.”418  The Export Clause requires only “that no burden by 
way of tax or duty can be cast upon the exportation of articles, and 
does not mean that articles exported are relieved from the prior 
ordinary burdens of taxation which rest upon all property similarly 
 
 410. Id. at 293 (citing Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899)). 
 411. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
 412. Id. at 295 (discussing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)). 
 413. Id. at 296–98. 
 414. Id. at 305. 
 415. Id. at 312.  This reasoning was affirmed in United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 
(1915), where the Court struck down a stamp tax on charter parties carrying cargo 
exclusively from American to foreign ports, finding that a tax on the charter parties 
was substantially a tax on exportation. 
 416. Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 426 (1904). 
 417. Id. at 418–19. 
 418. Id. at 427. 
2015 Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes 109 
 
situated.”419  Thus, the Clause applies to export but not to articles 
before their exportation—so a generally applicable tax could be 
constitutionally applied to export-bound filled cheese.420 
Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Company v. United States – 
1915  
Holding: a tax on a necessary incident to exportation 
unconstitutionally burdens exports.421 
At issue here were stamp taxes on marine insurance policies 
insuring certain exports against marine risks in transit to foreign 
ports.422  Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, concluded that “the 
tax upon such policies so directly and closely related to the ‘process 
of exporting’ that the tax is in substance a tax upon the 
exportation.”423  On reference to standard shipping practice and the 
government’s policy of insuring exports against war risks, he 
observed that “the business of exporting requires not only the 
contract of carriage, but appropriate provision for indemnity against 
marine risks during the voyage.  The policy of insurance is 
universally recognized as one of the ordinary ‘shipping 
documents.’”424  Since a tax on insurance policies burdens exports as 
much as taxes on bills of lading and the goods themselves, the tax 
was one on exports and unconstitutional.425 
A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards – 1923  
Holding: although a tax that attaches to goods in the 
manufacturing stage does not violate the Export Clause, a 
tax that attaches on the passing of title to export-bound 
goods does.426 
 
 419. Id.  Likewise, a generally applicable income tax can be levied on income from 
exportation, since the net income that is taxed is at least “as far removed from 
exportation as are articles intended for export before the exportation begins.”  William 
E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 175 (1918). 
 420. Cornell, 192 U.S. at 427–28. 
 421. Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 27 (1915). 
 422. Id. at 22. 
 423. Id. at 25. 
 424. Id. at 26. 
 425. Id. at 27. 
 426. A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 66–70 (1923). 
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At issue in A.G. Spalding & Bros. was whether a tax on certain 
items sold by a manufacturer or importer could properly apply to 
those items when commissioned by an agent for export.427  Justice 
Holmes, writing for the Court, noted that the transaction was intended 
from the beginning to be one for exporting the goods.428  The fact that 
the law was a general one “touching all sales of the class, and not 
aimed specially at exports” would not be enough to sustain the tax as 
applied to exports.429  Likewise, articles in the course of 
transportation are also exempt from tax.430  The key question was in 
fixing the point at which the export began.431  Per Cornell, goods still 
in the process of manufacture, even if intended for export and made 
with reference to a foreign order, are subject to taxation, whereas 
those loaded on a foreign-bound vessel with bills of lading issued are 
exempt.432  In the present case, the act of sale upon which the tax 
would attach—the passing of the title—had already “committed the 
goods to the carrier that was to take them across the sea, for the 
purpose of export and with the direction to the foreign port upon the 
goods.”433  At that point, the goods could not be taxed, since 
exportation had begun.434  The theoretical possibility that the agent 
could change its mind and retain the goods was too improbable to 
justify a different approach.435 
United States v. International Business Machines Corp. – 1996  
Holding: the Export Clause strictly prohibits taxes, 
discriminatory or not, falling on exports during the course of 
exportation, including on services and activities closely 
related to the export process.436  Pre-export goods and 
services, however, are excluded.437 
For over seventy years the Supreme Court remained silent on the 
Export Clause, until it took it up in this case, where a company 
challenged the imposition of a tax on insurance premiums it had paid 
 
 427. Id. at 68. 
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 429. Id. at 69. 
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 431. Id. at 69. 
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2015 Classifying Federal Taxes for Constitutional Purposes 111 
 
to foreign insurers to cover shipments of goods to its foreign 
subsidiaries.438  Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, pointed out 
that the Court “broadly exempted from federal taxation not only 
export goods, but also services and activities closely related to the 
export process[,]” while “limit[ing] the term ‘Articles exported’ to 
permit federal taxation of pre-export goods and services.”439  In its 
cases from the early 20th century, the Court made clear that “the 
Export Clause strictly prohibits any tax or duty, discriminatory or not, 
that falls on exports during the course of exportation.”440  However, 
the Export Clause does not extend to pre-export goods and services, 
nor does it cover “various services and activities only tangentially 
related to the export process.”441  That said, the Clause’s text suggests 
a broad intent to strictly limit the imposition of export taxes.  Since 
the question had not been raised of whether an assessment on a 
particular activity or service is so closely connected to the exported 
goods as to be a tax on the goods themselves, the Court declined to 
reexamine the holding of Thames & Mersey.442  Thus, “the Export 
Clause does not permit assessment of nondiscriminatory federal taxes 
on goods in export transit[,]” and per Thames & Mersey, this 
extended to insurance on export shipments.443 
United States v. United States Shoe Corp. – 1998  
Holding: a user fee affecting instrumentalities of export is 
permissible if it is (1) proportionate to the quantity or value 
of the goods exported, and (2) not excessive.444 
In United States Shoe Corp., the Court addressed whether a tax 
charged at 0.125% of the value of commercial cargo shipped through 
American ports was an impermissible export tax.445  Justice Ginsburg, 
 
 438. Id. 
 439. Id. at 846. 
 440. Id. at 848.  One of those cases, Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901), had 
found that a duty on merchandise imported into Puerto Rico from New York was not 
an export tax.  Rather sensibly, the Court there held that the word “export” connotes 
“something carried out of the United States,” that is “to goods exported to a foreign 
country[,]” and since Puerto Rico is not a foreign country, goods carried from New 
York to Puerto Rico are not being exported and thus are not subject to the Export 
Clause.  Id. at 154–55.  
 441. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. at 849–50. 
 442. Id. at 854–56. 
 443. Id. at 863. 
 444. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 369 (1998). 
 445. Id. at 363. 
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writing for the Court, held that the tax, “imposed on an ad valorem 
basis, is not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits 
furnished to the exporters, and therefore does not qualify as a 
permissible user fee.”446  The Export Clause allows no room for any 
federal tax, however generally applicable or nondiscriminatory, on 
goods in export transit.”447  An exaction is permissible if it is “a bona 
fide user fee,” i.e. not proportionate to the quantity or value of the 
goods exported and not excessive.448  The challenged tax failed the 
user fee criteria since the tax was “determined entirely on an ad 
valorem basis,” and “the value of the export cargo [did] not correlate 
reliably with the federal harbor services used or usable by the 
exporter.”449  A proper user fee would consider that “the extent and 
manner of port use depend on factors such as the size and tonnage of 
a vessel, the length of time it spends in port, and the services it 
requires, for instance, harbor dredging.”450 In this case the tax did not 
“fairly match the exporters’ use of port services and facilities[,]” and 
so it was an unconstitutional export tax.451 
E. In Summary 
The threshold question in analyzing any exaction is whether it is a 
tax for constitutional purposes or a penalty.  To determine whether a 
levy is a tax and subject to the restrictions of the tax clauses, the 
Court will examine whether it (1) produces some revenue, (2) avoids 
imposing an exceedingly heavy burden, (3) lacks elements of a 
punitive statute, and (4) is enforced by the revenue service alone.452  
A tax may be so punitive as to cease being a tax, and possibly violate 
due process; even so, the precise point remains undecided and ought 
to be addressed case by case.453  Congress, however, can tax 
inactivity, which is economically identical to giving a tax preference 
for an activity.454 
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 447. Id. at 367. 
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 451. Id. at 370. 
 452. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–95 (2012). 
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extent that a putative tax might violate due process if it amounts to a confiscation of 
property or leads to such gross inequality as to amount to a taking); see also Steward 
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If an exaction is a tax, it must be either direct or indirect.  Direct 
taxes consist of the following categories: capitations, taxes on real 
and personal property, and income from property.455  In view of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, only capitations and property taxes are 
subject to apportionment by population, while income from property 
is not.456  An income tax may be direct or indirect, depending on the 
source of the income; income itself evades precise definition, 
although it seems to presuppose some gain and realization of that 
gain.457  However, income is treated as income at the point when its 
amount becomes certain and definite.458  All taxes other than those 
identified as direct are deemed indirect and include: business gross 
receipts taxes,459 business profits taxes,460 gift taxes,461 social security 
taxes,462 estate taxes,463 inheritance taxes,464 and generally any excises 
on “particular us[es] or enjoyment[s] of property or shifting . . . of 
any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of 
property.”465 
Duties, imposts, and excises, per the Uniformity Clause, must be 
uniform throughout the United States.  Generally, the Clause is 
satisfied when a tax is levied in a geographically uniform way.466  
Otherwise, the Clause is satisfied where the subject of the tax is 
defined in non-geographic terms.  However, it is not fatal to the tax’s 
validity if the subject is defined in geographical terms, in which case 
a court ought to scrutinize the classification to determine if there is 
actual geographic discrimination.467 
The Export Clause generally prohibits taxes on exports.  The 
following have been held to be impermissible export taxes: ad 
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valorem taxes on the value of exported cargo;468 and taxes 
(discriminatory or otherwise) falling on exports during the course of 
exportation, including on services and activities closely related to the 
export process469 or necessary incidents to it.470  On the other hand, 
user fees affecting instrumentalities of exportation are permissible if 
they are (1) not proportionate to the quantity or value of the good 
exported, and (2) not excessive,471 for example, if they are fixed 
administrative fees imposed on goods bound for export without 
regard to quantity or value.472  Likewise, levies on pre-export goods 
and services, along with those on various services and activities 
tangentially related to the export process, are acceptable,473 as are 
generally applicable taxes on income from exportation.474  Taxes on 
goods carried from the incorporated United States to a territory are 
not considered export taxes.475 
III. DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL FOR 
CLASSIFYING TAXES 
 Having reviewed the Supreme Court’s case law on constitutional 
taxation provisions, certain articulable patterns emerge.  The power 
of Congress to levy taxes (Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises) is 
exceptionally broad.476  The definition of “taxes” in the Constitution 
is similar to the vernacular understanding of the term—impositions 
by the government to raise revenue.477  As the Court in National 
Federation of Independent Business concluded, the threshold for 
deeming an exaction a tax is quite easy to meet: it must raise some 
 
 468. Id. 
 469. United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 863 (1996). 
 470. Thames & Mersey Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19, 26–27 (1915). 
 471. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 369 (1998). 
 472. Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 375–76 (1875). 
 473. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S. at 850. 
 474. William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 174–75 (1918). 
 475. Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 156–57 (1901). 
 476. See, e.g., Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581–82 (1937) 
(observing that Congress has broad discretion to choose the subject matter of 
taxation); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176–77 (1796) (opinion of 
Paterson, J.) (noting that the term “taxes” is generic, covering all levies that could 
conceivably be enacted, and vesting in Congress a plenary taxation authority). 
 477. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines “tax” as “a charge, usu. monetary, imposed by the 
government on persons, entities, transactions, or property to yield public revenue.  
Most broadly, the term embraces all governmental impositions on the person, 
property, privileges, occupations, and enjoyment of the people, and includes duties, 
imposts, and excises.” (10th ed. 2014). 
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revenue and not be entirely punitive.478  The courts will not speculate 
on congressional motives in imposing a tax, nor will they question 
the tax’s restrictive effects, so long as the exaction produces some 
revenue, is not attended by “offensive regulation,” and operates as a 
tax.479  In any case, taxes in the Constitution are divided into two 
categories: direct and indirect.480  Direct taxes are expressly named, 
and the existence of indirect taxes is implied from that reference by 
negative implication.481  Notwithstanding Justice Chase’s assertion in 
Hylton,482 it is quite unlikely that there can be a tax simultaneously 
direct and indirect.483  By definition, the categories are mutually 
exclusive and cover all types of taxes—there can be no tax that is 
neither direct nor indirect. 
A. Direct Taxes 
Direct taxes fall into two broad categories: those that are subject to 
apportionment and those that are exempt.  From Hylton, the Court 
has unequivocally considered capitations and real property taxes to 
be direct.484  From Pollock, the Court has considered personal 
property taxes and taxes on income from real and personal property 
to be direct as well.485  Thus, for constitutional purposes, direct taxes 
are: capitations, property taxes, and taxes on the income derived from 
 
 478. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–97 (2012). 
 479. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937). 
 480. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 176 (1796). 
 481. Id. 
 482. Id. at 174 (“I believe some taxes may be both direct and indirect at the same time.”). 
 483. One might contend that an income tax that extends equally to wages and passive 
income could be a tax that is both direct and indirect.  Indeed, the Court in Pollock II 
struck down the entire taxation statute, including the parts that were not held to be a 
direct tax, as the law constituted “one entire scheme of taxation.”  Pollock II, 158 U.S. 
601, 637 (1895).  However, such a law is best understood not as a single tax both 
direct and indirect, but rather as several discrete taxes, some direct, others indirect, 
that together constitute the regime.  The question addressed in Pollock II was one of 
severability, whether “the parts are wholly independent of each other,” and the Court 
determined that if passive income was removed from taxation, then the tax burden 
would fall too severely on wage and other active income.  Id. at 635.  The Court also 
observed that a statute could lay a direct and an indirect tax, treating the two 
components separately.  Id. at 637 (“We do not mean to say that an act laying by 
apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income 
thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and 
vocations.”). 
 484. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176. 
 485. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 637.  See supra note 358 for a discussion of whether the 
Sixteenth Amendment removed income taxes from the definition of direct tax. 
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property.  The Sixteenth Amendment exempts income taxes from 
apportionment, but the other direct taxes are still subject to the rule.486  
The only income taxes that would have been subject to 
apportionment but for the Amendment are those on income from 
property, today called passive income, including capital gains, 
royalties, interest, dividends, rents, and the like.487  Only those taxes 
levied on property purely because of ownership are deemed direct.488  
Thus, levies that attach on sale, gift, death, or other action or event 
are considered indirect.  From here emerge the first two categories of 
a constitutional model of taxation: 
1. Direct taxes subject to apportionment: capitations and 
property taxes. 
 
2. Direct taxes exempt from apportionment: taxes on income 
derived from property (i.e., passive income). 
There is ambiguity about whether direct taxes exempt from 
apportionment are also exempt from the uniformity requirement.  It is 
clear that direct taxes subject to apportionment need not be uniform, 
as the apportionment process would necessarily entail non-uniform 
application of taxes, with the possible exception of pure capitations 
levied equally on each person.  As to direct taxes exempt from 
apportionment, the plain language of the Sixteenth Amendment, in 
providing that taxes on income, regardless of source, need not be 
apportioned, makes no reference to reclassifying direct income taxes 
as indirect or to applying to them the requirements of the Uniformity 
 
 486. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 487. It is curious that taxes on income from property are considered direct, whereas taxes 
imposed on individuals directly for income from their occupations are deemed 
indirect.  See Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895) (“We have considered the act only 
in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal 
property, [finding such taxes to be direct,] and have not commented on so much of it 
as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the 
instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the 
guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such.”).  The Sixteenth Amendment made 
this idiosyncrasy moot for practical purposes, and today active income has greater 
constitutional protection (it must be uniform) than does passive income (exempt from 
apportionment and not subject to uniformity). 
 488. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (holding that property taxes are 
direct when “imposed upon property simply because of its ownership”).  The Court’s 
expression of the idea of a direct tax is not the most accurate semantically.  A tax is 
not direct because the government imposes it because of ownership, but rather 
because it attaches for no other reason than the taxpayer’s ownership of the property. 
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Clause.489  On the other hand, one might argue that the drafters of the 
Sixteenth Amendment would not have wished for Congress to 
impose taxes on passive income that varied solely based on 
geographical location, and in any case, the Court’s decision in 
Brushaber to reclassify income taxes as indirect resolved the 
question.490  The counter-argument is that, at least as to real property, 
income from some property might merit different treatment because 
of its location, although classifying property based on its location, if 
applied uniformly throughout the United States (e.g., a tax on all 
seaside real property), would likely comply with the Uniformity 
Clause anyway.  Moreover, the Court’s ambiguous approach in the 
recently decided National Federation of Independent Business can be 
interpreted as overruling Brushaber.  On balance, the most likely 
answer is that passive income is indeed exempt from both 
apportionment and uniformity.491  Regardless, it would be 
extraordinarily difficult, politically, to levy a truly non-uniform tax 
on passive income, and such a tax might still be found 
unconstitutional under some non-tax provision, such as the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process protections. 
B. Indirect Taxes 
The counterpart to direct taxes is indirect taxes.  Their existence is 
implied negatively by the explicit references to direct taxes, and they 
are best understood as being that which direct taxes are not.492  Thus, 
only by having identified which taxes are direct can one define the 
indirect variety.  The Constitution expressly references four types of 
 
 489. See Morrow, supra note 21, at 412 (“If the Sixteenth Amendment is passed such a tax 
[subject to neither the rule of uniformity nor apportionment] will have been 
discovered.”). 
 490. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1916). 
 491. But see Jensen, supra note 16, at 2341–42 n.37 (arguing that, per Brushaber, “income 
taxes must satisfy the uniformity rule”).  It is unclear to what extent the holding in 
Brushaber, that income taxes are indirect taxes given that a source inquiry is 
prohibited, is still good law in the light of the ambiguity introduced by Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business, as discussed in 
greater depth above.  See supra note 332.  In divining the Court’s mystical coans on 
this topic, there is no clear answer—only speculation. 
 492. But see Edward B. Whitney, The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 
280, 292 (1907) (“Indirect taxation is not . . . mentioned in the Constitution itself, and 
nothing in the Constitution requires us to give it a legal definition. . . .  The distinction 
between direct and indirect taxation belongs, or belonged (if it is obsolete), to political 
economy, not to law.”). 
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indirect taxes: duties, imposts, excises, and export taxes.493  One can 
dispose quickly of the latter, as the Constitution prohibits taxes on 
exports.494  The other three types of enumerated indirect taxes, 
however, have been sources of definitional consternation for some 
time.  Since Pacific Insurance Co., the Court repeatedly attempted to 
define the terms, citing different definitions over the years.  It hardly 
helped that the Court appeared to use “duties” and “excises” 
interchangeably, and, in upholding various indirect taxes, called them 
“duties or excises.”495  Thus, in Pacific Insurance Co., duties were 
“things due and recoverable by law” or by an alternative definition—
synonymous with customs; imposts were import taxes; and excises 
were domestic taxes on the consumption of commodities or retail 
sales.496  In Pollock II, duties were taxes on import, export, and 
consumption; imposts were any indirect tax; and excises were taxes 
on goods or licenses.497  In Patton v. Brady, excises were taxes levied 
on articles intended for consumption and imposed between the 
beginning of manufacture and final consumption.498  In Thomas v. 
United States, the Court, in evident frustration, noted that duties, 
imposts, and excises elude precise definition but are “used 
comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties imposed on 
importation, consumption, manufacture and sale of certain 
commodities, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, 
occupations and the like.”499  In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., the Court 
defined duties and imposts as import and export levies, and excises as 
taxes on manufacture, sale, and consumption, as well as occupational 
license taxes and taxes on corporate privileges.500  The Court last 
addressed the question in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, where it 
observed that direct taxes, duties, imposts, and excises “include every 
form of tax appropriate to sovereignty,” and that whether an indirect 
tax is classified as a duty, impost, or excise is of minimal 
 
 493. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 494. Id. art I, § 9, cl. 5. 
 495. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900) (holding that an inheritance tax 
was “a duty or excise”). 
 496. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 (1868). 
 497. Pollock II, 158 U.S. 601, 622 (1895).  There was some ambiguity introduced in 
Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 348 (1875), about whether occupational and 
license fees were duties or excises or some other form of indirect tax, as Justice 
Clifford there appeared to suggest in dicta that license fees might be separate from 
duties, imposts, and excises, but later cases such as Pollock II referred to license fees 
as excises.  158 U.S. at 656. 
 498. 184 U.S. 608, 617 (1902). 
 499. 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904). 
 500. 220 U.S. 107, 151 (1911). 
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importance.501  The Court did note that although there might be 
indirect taxes that are not duties, imposts, or excises, their existence 
remained undiscovered.502 
Even though the Court apparently gave up on the task of precisely 
defining duties, imposts, and excises, the definitions are nonetheless 
important for developing a coherent view of federal taxation’s 
boundaries.  Black’s Law Dictionary crystallizes the definitions of 
each of these three types of taxes well.  A duty is defined as a “tax 
imposed on a commodity or transaction, esp. on imports . . . .  A duty 
in this sense is imposed on things, not persons.”503  An impost is a 
“tax or duty, esp. a customs duty.”504  An excise is a “tax imposed on 
the manufacture, sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette tax), or on 
an occupation or activity (such as a license tax or an attorney 
occupation fee).”505  These definitions generally comport with the 
 
 501. 301 U.S. 548, 581–82 (1937). 
 502. Id. at 582. 
 503. Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Some taxes that bear the name 
“duty” listed in the same category include accounts duties, ad valorem duties, customs 
duties, death duties, and succession duties, among others.  By comparison, the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines “duty” as: 
 A payment to the public revenue levied upon the import, export, 
manufacture, or sale of certain commodities, the transfer of or 
succession to property, licence to use certain things or practise 
certain trades or pursuits, or the legal recognition of deeds and 
documents, as contracts, receipts, certificates, protests, affidavits, 
etc.  Applied to the payments included under the several heads of 
customs, excise, licences, stamp-duties, probate and succession 
duties (death duties), inhabited house duty.  In general, ‘duties’ 
differ from other taxes in that they are levied upon specific 
articles or transactions, and not upon persons whether by 
capitation or in proportion to their income or possessions.  But the 
distinction is not strictly observed in language; a ‘window-tax’ 
and ‘dog-tax’ are duties, as much as the inhabited house duty, or 
the duty on men-servants. 
 Duty, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989). 
 504. Impost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “impost” as: 
 A tax, duty, imposition, tribute; spec. a customs-duty levied on 
merchandise.  Now chiefly Hist.  The distinction suggested by 
Cowell, that impost properly denotes a duty on imported goods, 
and custom one on goods exported, is repeated by later dicts.; but 
there is no evidence that it was ever in accepted use. 
 Impost, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989). 
 505. Excise, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “excise” as, generally, “[a]ny toll or tax,” and specifically: 
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Court’s attempts to define these tax types.506  In sum, indirect taxes 
can be defined as taxes on transactions, activities, or changes in 
position.  Thus, two more categories emerge for a taxation model: 
3.  Indirect taxes subject to uniformity: duties, imposts, and 
excises. 
 
4.  Indirect taxes prohibited: export taxes. 
Were one to conclude here, however, the model would remain 
incomplete.  As mentioned, there are direct taxes and indirect taxes, 
and these two mutually exclusive categories cover all conceivable 
taxes.  The Constitution provides that all direct taxes (except those on 
 
 A duty charged on home goods, either in the process of their 
manufacture or before their sale to the home consumers” (Encycl. 
Brit.).  In England this kind of taxation was first adopted in 1643, 
in acknowledged imitation of the example of Holland. . . .   The 
taxes levied under the name of Excise by the Ordinance of 1643 
included certain duties imposed, in addition to the customs, on 
various foreign products; it was not until the 19th century that the 
actual use of the word became strictly conformed to the preceding 
definition. 
 Excise, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989). 
 506. The Court’s definitions may have deviated significantly from what an original 
understanding of the terms implied.  See Whitney, supra note 490, at 293: 
 In Great Britain the words ‘tax’ and ‘duty’ had had legal 
definitions for a century, exclusive of each other, settled and 
unvarying in their statutory use.  A tax was laid upon all property, 
or upon all real property, at a valuation, and always by a rule of 
apportionment.  The only ‘tax’ in actual use was the general land 
tax.  Everything that was not a tax in this restricted sense was a 
duty.  No duties were laid by any system of apportionment.  All 
were laid by a rule of uniformity.  This unvarying distinction in 
terms in the statute book cannot have been accidental, and must 
have been familiar to lawyers. 
 The same commentator also proposed treating capitations as a separate category apart 
from direct taxes, id. at 280, and that direct taxes “would be the general property taxes 
laid according to a general valuation, while [duties, imposts, and excises] would 
include those on specific property, together with stamp duties, license duties, business 
duties, and duties on salaries and pensions,” and “[t]axes invented in the future (and 
the general income tax is one of these) would be left to be classified in the future[,]” 
id. at 296. 
 For another view, see Johnson, supra note 44, at 300: “‘Impost’ was a reference to a 
tax on imports, now more commonly called ‘tariffs’ or ‘custom duties.’  ‘Duty’ was 
apparently a reference to a stamp tax on legal documents.  ‘Excise tax’ referred, 
originally but not exclusively, to tax on whiskey.” 
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income) must be apportioned.507  However, in setting the uniformity 
rule, the Constitution does not apply it to all indirect taxes; rather, the 
rule applies only to duties, imposts, and excises.  The interpretational 
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (meaning “the 
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others”) suggests 
that a non-exhaustive list of things enumerated presupposes 
something not enumerated.508  Indeed, Justice Chase, in his Hylton 
opinion, observed that “[i]f the framers of the Constitution did not 
contemplate other taxes than direct taxes, and duties, imposts, and 
excises, there is great inaccuracy in their language.  If these four 
species of taxes were all that were meditated, the general power to 
lay taxes was unnecessary.”509  This leaves us with a fifth and final 
category in the model: 
5.  Indirect taxes exempt from uniformity. 
The one example of such a tax is one that predates the Constitution 
itself and has not been levied since America’s current governing 
document took effect: requisitions.510  Requisitions were the primary 
 
 507. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. 
 508. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 107–11 (Thomson/West ed. 2012) (calling the doctrine the “negative-
implication canon”). 
 509. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173 (1793) (opinion of Chase, J.); see 
also Jensen, supra note 21, at 712 (“It is not a new idea that some taxes might be 
immune from both the apportionment requirement and the uniformity rule.”); but see 
Pollock I, 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895) (“Although there have been from time to time 
intimations that there might be some tax which was not a direct tax nor included under 
the words ‘duties, imposts and excises,’ such a tax for more than 100 years of national 
existence has as yet remained undiscovered . . . .”). 
 510. One might question whether requisitions could be levied constitutionally.  If Congress 
were careful in crafting a requisition law to avoid Tenth Amendment commandeering 
concerns and intergovernmental tax immunity issues (which might not be easy, since 
the anti-commandeering rule prevents Congress from forcing a state to use its political 
process to follow federal dictate, while intergovernmental tax immunity prevents 
Congress from levying a tax directly on the sovereign operations of a state (and vice 
versa)), cf., e.g., Rob Gunning, Into and Out of the Bog: The Intergovernmental Tax 
Immunity Doctrine, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 151, 151 (2005); William D. Marsh, 
Note, Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Beyond South Carolina v. Baker, 13 BYU L. 
REV. 249, 259–60 (1989), it would appear that on balance requisitions would be 
allowable, especially given the Court’s reticence over the past century to strike down 
taxes. Compare Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1957, 1988–89 (1993) (“[The Constitution] was not conditioned on the 
continued futility of requisitions . . . .  Today, under an originalist analysis . . . the 
federal government may not reclaim that discarded instrument now that it might prove 
more efficacious.”), with Strahilevitz, supra note 31, at 918 (“[I]t seems highly likely 
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way by which the Articles of Confederation contemplated the federal 
government would raise revenue.511  Under that system, the Congress 
of the Confederation determined the amount of revenue needed for 
national purposes and required each state to supply the fraction of the 
total sum relative to the value of real property (land and buildings and 
improvements) within that state, by such valuation method as the 
Congress determined.512 
A requisition scheme would almost certainly be deemed a tax, as it 
would raise revenue and not be punitive in its intent or operation.513  
Moreover, since it would be imposed neither on individual taxpayers, 
nor on property directly (it need not be measured based on property at 
all), it would not be a direct tax.514  And referring to the definitions of 
the specifically enumerated indirect taxes discussed above, it is clear 
that a requisition is not a duty, impost, or excise. 
 
that requisitions were considered the paradigmatic examples of ‘indirect taxes’ 
specifically authorized by the Constitution.”); Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen, 
Commandeering, the Tenth Amendment, and the Federal Requisition Power: New 
York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 379 (1998) (“[T]here is 
substantial evidence that the Constitution left intact the federal government’s power to 
impose requisitions on the states.”); see also Jensen, supra note 16, at 2400–01 (“But 
whether or not requisitions are permitted under the existing constitutional scheme, 
they have not been attempted.”). 
 511. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII. 
 512. Id. 
 513. See Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment 
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 845–46 (2009) (“It is probable 
that ‘requisitions’ on states are included within ‘Taxes,’ although the issue has never 
squarely arisen (as no requisition has been enacted by Congress under the 
Constitution).”). 
 514. Some commentators have argued that a requisition would be a direct tax.  See id. at 
841 (“[T]he category of ‘direct tax’ (subject to the apportionment requirement) is 
limited to requisitions, capitation taxes, and taxes on tangible property.”).  However, 
this position erroneously conflates “direct taxes” with “taxes that are capable of being 
apportioned,” an apparent misreading of Justice Iredell’s argument in Hylton.  Cf. 
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“As 
all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the Constitution contemplated 
none as direct but such as could be apportioned.”).  While it may be true that all direct 
taxes must be taxes capable of being apportioned, it does not follow that all taxes that 
are capable of being apportioned are direct.  Although a requisition can indeed be 
apportioned based on population, it is not a direct tax, at least so far as the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the term.  See also Jensen, supra note 16, at 2338 (“[M]any 
founders distinguished a direct-tax regime from the ineffective requisitions process 
used under the Articles of Confederation: Congress issued requisitions for revenue to 
the states, and each state could determine how . . . its obligation would be satisfied.  
Direct taxes are instead imposed by the national government directly on individual 
taxpayers.”). 
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In Hylton, Justices Paterson and Iredell suggested in dicta that if 
there were to be a tax which was indirect but not a duty, impost, or 
excise, then it would nonetheless be subject to uniformity.515  Justice 
Chase disagreed—and was correct in doing so.516  It is hard to 
conceive how a requisition could be applied geographically 
uniformly, as the Uniformity Clause requires geographical uniformity 
not just among the states but within them as well.517  Whether a 
requisition were allocated today based on property value or some 
other metric, except perhaps on a per-head basis, it cannot be uniform 
throughout the United States.  While it might be applied 
geographically uniformly as between the states themselves, the 
operation of the requisition within the states would not be uniform; 
which is what is required to satisfy the Uniformity Clause.  For 
example, if a requisition scheme were imposed, taking as the basis of 
allocation the value of non-federally-owned real property in the 
states, and if the states passed the cost of the tax down to the property 
owners, due to inherent differences in population densities and 
property values among the states, the burden would not be borne on a 
geographically uniform basis.  In other words, two otherwise equally 
situated property owners might well bear different tax burdens, solely 
because of their residence (i.e., geographical location).  All of this is 
not to say that a requisition could be arbitrarily imposed in varying 
amounts on different states.  Even if the apportionment and 
uniformity rules do not present an obstacle, the law must still 
conform to constitutional due process constraints. 
 
 515. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“There may, perhaps, be an 
indirect tax on a particular article, that cannot be comprehended within the description 
of duties, or imposts, or excises; in such case it will be comprised under the general 
denomination of taxes. . . .  The question occurs, how is such tax to be laid, uniformly 
or apportionately?  The rule of uniformity will apply, because it is an indirect tax, and 
direct taxes only are to be apportioned.”); Id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“If it can 
be considered as a tax, neither direct within the meaning of the Constitution, nor 
comprehended within the term duty, impost or excise; there is no provision in the 
Constitution, one way or another, and then it must be left to such an operation of the 
power, as if the authority to lay taxes had been given generally in all instances, 
without saying whether they should be apportioned or uniform; and in that case, I 
should presume, the tax ought to be uniform; because the present Constitution was 
particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases 
specified . . . .”). 
 516. Id. at 173 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“If there are any other species of taxes that are not 
direct, and not included within the words duties, imposts, or excises, they may be laid 
by the rule of uniformity, or not; as Congress shall think proper and reasonable.”). 
 517. Contra Strahilevitz, supra note 31, at 918 (“As long as Congress applied the same 
formula to all states, a requisition would be a constitutional [uniform] indirect tax.”). 
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In brief summary, to present in one place the five-part model that 
emerges from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on taxation, there 
are: 
1.  Direct taxes subject to apportionment: capitations and 
property taxes. 
 
2. Direct taxes exempt from apportionment: taxes on income 
derived from property (i.e., passive income). 
 
3. Indirect taxes subject to uniformity: duties, imposts, and 
excises. 
 
4. Indirect taxes prohibited: export taxes. 
 
5. Indirect taxes exempt from uniformity. 
IV. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
“O brave new world, / That has such taxes in’t!”518 
As government expenditures continue to outpace revenues, many 
have pushed to expand the intake.  To that effect, a variety of 
additional taxes have been proposed or discussed in academic 
literature on the subject, the most prominent of which are addressed 
here and classified by the five-part model distilled in the previous 
section, as examples of the model’s practical application.  The 
proposed taxes were selected based on their novelty, and at least in 
the case of the last two, their singular creativity.  The analyses that 
follow are brief and represent the author’s thoughts on the 
appropriate categorization of these taxes, in the light of the lengthier 
reflections above. 
A. Federal Consumption Tax 
Sales taxes are ubiquitous in the United States, levied by the 
overwhelming majority of American state governments.519  The 
federal government, however, has never imposed a broadly based 
 
 518. As Shakespeare’s Miranda might say were she a tax lawyer.  Cf. WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1 (Rev. ed., Yale Univ. Press 1955); but see 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2 
(Tucker Brooke ed., Yale Univ. Press 1923) (“The first thing we do, let’s kill all the 
lawyers.”). 
 519. Scott Drenkard, State and Local Sales Tax Rates in 2014, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 18, 
2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2014. 
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consumption tax.  With revenues projected to become a major 
problem for the United States, various consumption tax ideas have 
been floated.  These include instituting a value-added tax (VAT),520 a 
type of tax already imposed by many countries, as well as more 
arcane proposals, such as the flat521 and the unlimited savings 
allowance taxes.522  A federal sales or VAT-type tax would clearly 
fall into the category of duties, imposts, and excises, as it would be 
imposed on transactions and would be levied indirectly.523  It would 
therefore be a third-category tax, an indirect tax subject to uniformity.   
Some other proposed taxes, such as the flat and the unlimited 
savings allowance taxes are somewhat more complicated.524  The 
basic idea of both is that an individual must pay taxes on his annual 
income, with the income reduced by the amount saved that year (it is 
thus the inverse of a wealth tax).  For businesses, the calculation is 
similar, except that they offset their income by investments made.  
The end result is that the taxpayer is taxed on his consumption.  The 
classification of these taxes is not readily apparent.  Since they appear 
to have qualities of both direct and indirect taxes, they have been 
called “direct-consumption taxes.”525  So far as these taxes are levied 
on passive income, they are indeed direct,526 but fall into the category 
 
 520. See generally The VAT Reader: What a Federal Consumption Tax Would Mean for 
America, TAX ANALYSTS (2011), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files
/VATReader.pdf/$file/VATReader.pdf (a collection of articles arguing for the 
imposition of a VAT in addition to the income tax); Americans for Fair Taxation, 
How FAIRtax Works: Your Money, Your Decision, FAIRTAX.ORG (2014), 
https://fairtax.org/about/how-fairtax-works (arguing for the wholesale replacement of 
the income tax by a consumption tax). 
 521. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 84 (2d ed. 1995).  This proposal 
is not to be confused with the flat income tax that has been mooted in recent years.  
E.g., Jeanne Sahadi, Rand Paul’s Hopes for a Flat Tax, CNN MONEY (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/pf/taxes/rand-paul-flat-tax/. 
 522. Proposed by legislators and described in brief by Professors Zelenak and Jensen in 
their respective articles.  Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, 
and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833–36 (1999); Jensen, 
supra note 16, at 2402–05. 
 523. But see Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 521 (1899) (observing in dicta that “a tax upon 
every sale made in any place” would be a tax on property and so direct). 
 524. See Jensen, supra note 16, at 2403–04 (concluding that other proposed taxes, such as 
the flat and the unlimited savings allowance taxes, are somewhat more complicated). 
 525. Id. at 2407. 
 526. Cf. Zelenak, supra note 522, at 842 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s understanding, 
expressed in the Pollock opinion of 1895, [is] that a tax imposed solely on earned 
income is not a direct tax. . . .  the tax on earned income was invalidated only because 
the Court viewed it as not severable from the unapportioned direct tax on income from 
property.”). 
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of income taxes.  These direct-consumption taxes effectively tax only 
the portion of income spent on consumption; nonetheless, it cannot 
be denied that they do tax income.527  The starting point for 
calculating the amount of tax due is income earned for the year.  
Even when reduced by the amount of savings or investments, the 
remainder is still properly characterized as income.528  It has become 
axiomatic in tax law that “every deduction from gross income is 
allowed as a matter of legislative grace.”529  That Congress decided to 
allow a deduction for savings, as opposed to any one of the panoply 
of current deductions and offsets, does not change the character of the 
thing taxed.530  These unusual income taxes, to the extent they fall on 
passive income, would land in the second category—direct taxes 
exempt from apportionment; the remainder would be placed in the 
third—indirect taxes subject to uniformity. 
B. Federal Property Tax 
Today, all states tax real estate and many tax some personal 
property on an ad valorem basis.531  These taxes are, in addition to 
capitations, the quintessential direct taxes.  Unlike the federal 
government, the states do not have any federal constitutional 
restrictions on their ability to levy direct taxes.  Should the federal 
government attempt to tax real or personal property based on its 
value, such as by instituting a national real property tax, it would 
have to apportion it as required by the Constitution.532  Arguments 
that a federal ad valorem property tax is an income tax on the yield 
from property are unpersuasive, especially as an income tax is 
substantially “a tax on economic outcomes,” requiring some form of 
realization, a feature lacking in a property tax.533  A federal property 
tax would fall into the first category of the model—direct taxes 
subject to apportionment. 
 
 527. But see Jensen, supra note 16, at 2408–09. 
 528. See Zelenak, supra note 522, at 846 (arguing that “excluding saved income from the 
tax base” is not “inconsistent with an income tax”). 
 529. White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281, 292 (1938). 
 530. Even if the tax were to be considered a non-income tax, it would only invalidate any 
portion of the tax that was on passive income and not apportioned (unless the direct-
tax component was not severable from the indirect-tax part).  The remainder, 
including that on wages, would be characterized as an indirect tax, subject to 
uniformity. 
 531. See Dodge, supra note 513, at 929–31. 
 532. See Berg, supra note 22, at 211. 
 533. See Dodge, supra note 513, at 932. 
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C. Wealth Tax 
In recent years, the idea of a national wealth tax has found 
traction.534  In its several variants, ultimately such a tax would fall 
upon the wealth owned by individuals, including real property, 
tangible and intangible personal property, and cash.  So far as the 
wealth tax included in its base real and personal property, it would be 
direct for the same reason that a federal property tax would be 
direct.535  Such a tax is not an excise on the privilege of holding 
property,536 as an excise on a privilege implies “discrete positive-law 
benefits conferred by government,” or at least some action or change 
in position to which the excise would attach.537  Here, the tax would 
be levied on property simply because of its ownership.538  Again, this 
would be a quintessential example of a first-category tax—a direct 
tax subject to apportionment. 
D. Mark-to-Market Tax 
A mark-to-market tax on publicly traded securities, like its more 
broadly based cousin, the wealth tax, has also found its advocates.539  
This proposal involves taxing the increases in the value of publicly 
 
 534. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 95 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1999); Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock: The Constitutionality of 
Federal Wealth or Sales Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES 1723, 1724 (2002); Deborah H. 
Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 424 (2000); 
Ackerman, supra note 20, at 56–58 (arguing for a federal wealth tax); but see Erik M. 
Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821, 822 (2003); Erik 
M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and The Meaning of 
‘Incomes’, 97 TAX NOTES 99, 99–100 (2002). 
 535. See Berg, supra note 22, at 211–12. 
 536. Contra Richard W. Lindholm, The Constitutionality of a Federal Net Wealth Tax: A 
Socioeconomic Analysis of a Strategy Aimed at Ending the Under-Taxation of Land, 
43 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 451, 454 (1984) (arguing that an unapportioned wealth tax 
would be constitutional because the Court could separate the measure of the tax from 
its base, but that to be safe, it would be best to exclude land from the wealth tax base). 
 537. Dodge, supra note 513, at 933–34. 
 538. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 597–98 (1881) (noting Alexander 
Hamilton’s observation that taxes levied on the whole property of individuals or upon 
their entire real or personal estate are direct). 
 539. See, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can Marking Stock to Market 
Replace the Corporate Tax?, 143 TAX NOTES 139 (2014) (describing a proposal to 
replace the corporate income tax with a mark-to-market tax on publicly traded stocks); 
David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 109 TAX NOTES 
1047 (2005) (proposing a progressive mark-to-market tax on publicly traded property 
and derivatives). 
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traded stock at regular intervals without regard to realization.540  In its 
typical form, this proposal extends only to publicly traded property, 
presumably because of easier monitoring and valuation.541  Since a 
broadly based mark-to-market tax on unrealized capital gains would 
attach to personal property held by an individual simply because of 
his ownership of that property, it would be direct.  Moreover, because 
there is no realization involved, it cannot be an income tax exempt 
from apportionment.  Granted, there are already limited mark-to-
market regimes for dealers in securities,542 for futures contracts and 
options,543 and an exit tax on the property of certain expatriates,544 
none of which have run into fatal challenges in the courts.  However, 
these particular cases can be differentiated, as they involve either 
something more than the passive holding of securities or some 
change in position justifying what can effectively be deemed excise 
tax regimes.545  Accordingly, a mark-to-market tax would be, like the 
wealth tax, a first-category direct tax subject to apportionment. 
E. Requisition Tax 
Conceived as a possible replacement for the federal income tax, a 
requisition tax would resurrect the taxation regime in place before the 
Constitution went into effect.546  Under this proposal, the federal 
government would create a formula determining each state’s fiscal 
obligations to the national treasury.547  The formula might be based 
on the relative share of total national income earned in the aggregate 
by a state’s residents,548 or any other rationally based rule.  Each state 
would then collect the assigned sum from its residents in whatever 
way it deems most appropriate.549  As discussed in the previous part, 
 
 540. See Miller, supra note 539, at 1067. 
 541. Id. at 1053. 
 542. I.R.C. § 475 (2012). 
 543. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012). 
 544. I.R.C. § 877A (2012).  The exit tax has not gone unchallenged in commentary, 
however.  See, e.g., Berg, supra note 322, at 214. 
 545. The author has addressed this question, as well as the constitutionality of a broadly 
based mark-to-market tax generally, in an earlier article.  See Gene Magidenko, Is a 
Broadly Based Mark-to-Market Tax Unconstitutional?, 143 TAX NOTES 952 (2014). 
 546. See Strahilevitz, supra note 321, at 923–25. 
 547. Id. at 923–24. 
 548. Id. at 924. 
 549. Different states would presumably have different ideas about how best to assign the 
burden and collection of the tax, thereby functioning as “laboratories of democracy.”  
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
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since a requisition is not imposed directly on individuals or 
property—and it is not a duty, an impost, or an excise—it would be 
the prime example of a fifth-category indirect tax exempt from 
uniformity. 
F. Imputed Income Tax 
The idea of a tax on imputed income has arisen in at least some 
quarters.  “[I]mputed income” is “the rental value of an asset owned 
by the taxpayer that is held for personal use.”550  Such a tax could be 
measured, for example, by a levy on the amount of rent that a 
homeowner would expect to receive by renting out his home instead 
of living in it.  Although such a tax might appear to have the 
characteristics of both an excise (as a tax on the ostensible “use” of a 
home) and a property tax (a tax on property because of its 
ownership),551 in substance it cannot be anything but a property tax.  
The rental value of property is often intimately linked to the 
property’s actual value.  In a case where the income is only 
hypothetical and where the value of a tax is determined with 
reference to the property’s value, this tax falls again into the first 
category—a direct tax subject to apportionment.552 
G. Personal Endowment Tax 
In the world of zany tax ideas, a personal endowment tax probably 
takes the prize.  It is “a tax on a person’s human capital, or wage-
earning capacity. . . .  a tax on income-producing potential, as 
 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 The difficulty with a requisition tax today recalls the country’s experience under the 
old Articles of Confederation—how is it to be enforced?  If a state refuses to comply, 
the federal government could try, for example, to levy payroll or income taxes directly 
on the citizens of the recalcitrant state, a power not available when requisitions were 
last attempted.  Strahilevitz, supra note 321, at 925.  Since the federal government’s 
ability to coerce the states is limited, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 
(1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”), taxing individuals directly may be less constitutionally 
objectionable than most alternative enforcement mechanisms, though it is by no 
means free from doubt.  See supra note 358. 
 550. Dodge, supra note 513, at 934. 
 551. Id. at 935–36. 
 552. See Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378–381 (1934) (holding that a 
tax on the rental value of the part of a building occupied by the owner is direct and not 
on income). 
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opposed to economic uses or outcomes.”553  It would presumably be 
measured by factors such as innate ability (genetics), education, and 
family status.  At first glance, this tax seems akin to a capitation, as in 
some respects it is a levy on simply existing, measured by one’s 
“human capital.”  It is not unlike a property tax imposed on 
unrealized value, which as noted above is direct.  Yet human capital 
is not capital in the tax sense.  Any wages that might be paid in 
compensation for one’s labor, or income derived from labor, at least 
for constitutional purposes, are indirect.554  If such a tax were to be 
found otherwise constitutionally acceptable, surely a very doubtful 
assumption,555 it would probably fall into the fifth category of indirect 
taxes exempt from uniformity.  It is an indirect tax because it is 
derived from potential human labor, but since it does not attach due 
to a transaction, activity, or change in position, it cannot be deemed a 
duty, impost, or excise. 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 At the risk of stating the obvious, tax reform is a very thorny 
matter.  As time passes and the national government’s fiscal deficits 
continue, tax reform will loom ever more urgently.  Although there 
are systemic obstacles to substantively changing the tax code, given 
the status quo, it is hard to suppose that new taxes will not be 
imposed in the future—the question seems one of timing more than 
anything else.  America’s system of governance allows for great 
latitude in federal taxation, and this discretion makes wise decision-
making at the helm vital.556  To that end, this Article has presented a 
model to facilitate lucid thought about taxes as integrated facets of 
the constitutional regime.  As lawmakers and commentators 
contemplate taxation, they will find it helpful to consider not just the 
particulars but also how those particulars fit into the larger picture.  
 
 553. Dodge, supra note 513, at 938. 
 554. See supra note 488 and accompanying text. 
 555. For one, such a tax would effectively force someone to work against his will, quite 
possibly in a job he dislikes, raising serious equity concerns.  See Dodge, supra note 
513, at 939 n.433.  In addition, since this tax could not be readily avoided (as can a 
property tax by disposing of property, for example), it would almost certainly run 
afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction.”). 
 556. As John Adams wrote the day after (what has become) tax day: “[P]ublic Virtue is the 
only Foundation of Republics.  There must be a positive Passion for the public good . 
. . .”  Letter of John Adams to Mercy Warren (Apr. 16, 1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 670 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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Analysis that extends to only the specific or only the abstract is 
narrow and unlikely to lead to precise thought and well-reasoned 
decisions.  Balancing particularity with abstraction, the model of 
taxation outlined here, derived from Supreme Court jurisprudence 
and informed by historical practice and experience, provides a 
conceptual framework for scrutinizing taxes and understanding how 
they fit into the constitutional design. 
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